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(PLEASE READ AND CIRCULATE.) 


MEMOIR 

i I 


OF 


GENERAL SCOTT, 


FROM RECORDS 


COTEMPORANEOUS WITH THE EVENTS. 


WASHINGTON: 

C. ALEXANDER, PRINTER. 

1 8 5 2 . 








M E M 0 III 



A pictorial life of General Scott, which contains 
evidence on every page of being an autobiog¬ 
raphy prepared In advance of the B dtimore Con¬ 
vention, was thrown into circulation on the in¬ 
stant after his nomination. It was doubtless 
intended as much to control the decision of 
the nominating body, by private exhibition 
among its members, as subsequently to give 
impulse to the military campaign into which 
it was resolved to convert the presidential elec¬ 
tion. The life is illustrated with, two dozen 
wood-cuts, displaying as many scenes in which 
the General is always presented a giant among 
pigmies—a Gulliver in Lilliput—and the story 
as told is in perfect keeping with the dispro¬ 
portions of the pictures. An enormous vanity, 
lookb' r through a long and dim vista reaching 
bar’ forty years, turns all associates in the re- 
.nm, ; fc distance into mere atoms, while by appro¬ 
priating what belonged to them it swells itself to 
„he dimensions of the fabulous Titan. General 
Scott’s egotism, as it appears in his autobiog¬ 
raphy, has grown great like Aaron’s serpent. 
His reputation has in his commentaries swal¬ 
lowed up the glory of every other man who 
figured in our military annals. 

It is due to the illustrious dead—to Brown, 
the self-taught quaker Pennsylvanian, who first 
turned the tide of battle in our favor in the North, 
at Sackett’s Harbor, with the hastily gathered 
militia of the neighborhood—who stepped from 
his farm to the head of that newly recruited army 
which carried out his glorious conception of the 
Niagara campaign, and who like Jackson, anoth¬ 
er militia General, humbled the veteran invin- 
eibles of Wellington beneath the blows of a 
citizen soldiery of half their numbers—it is due 
to Pike, to Ripley, to Brady, to Leavenworth, 
to McNeill, to Miller, to Van Rensellaer, to 
Christie, Wadsworth, to Wool, Dearborn, Lew¬ 
is, Chauncey, Gaines, Macomb, and Jackson, 
of the war of 1812—to Taylor, Worth, Duncan, 
the injured dead of the last war, to vindicate 
their fame from the disparagement attempted by 
General Scott, prompted by envy, and urged on 
by ambition. The few surviving associates of 
the gallant soldiers whom Scott has insidiously 
sought to injure, and who have experienced at 


his hands the same ungenerous treatment, are 
living witnesses of the wrong which the record 
will, when adduced, expose. 

Generals Towsoxand jEsupare the sole survi¬ 
vors of the distinguished field officers with Scott, 
when he fought under Brown in the brilliant Ni¬ 
agara campaign. They cannot but look with 
disgust on the book blazoned with pictures got 
up by General Scott, for electioneering purposes , 
and in which he every where struts the chief, 
when he was in every sense the subordinate. 

It is a marked trait in Scott’s career, that he 
hated all his superiors in grade, and that no 
man whose distinguished services in any station 
rendered him a rival in Scott’s eye, ever escaped 
his envy, or failed to feel the effects of his sin¬ 
ister attempts, openly or covertly, made on the 
high reputations they had earned. 

Wilkinson and Scott. 

General Wilkinson was the first to suffer from 
Scott’s unhappy propensity to decry superiors. 
In 1814, a memoir of General Scott, (gotten up 
by himself, as Gen. Wilkinson alleges,) abuses 
the latter as the author of the charges on which 
he, Scott, was convicted and suspended in 1809. 
Wilkinson shows that this was false by record 
evidence;—gives an account of his relations with 
Scott from the day when, as a young Captain, 
the latter joined his army on the Mississippi. 
Scott had written an abusive letter against him 
on the way to New Orleans, in consequence of 
Captain Bankhead being placed over him in 
command, on the transports which conveyed 
their companies. On his arrival at New Orleans, 
Scott thus introduced himself, says Wilkinson: 
“ It is probable General you may have heard of my 
having written a free letter to you, in which, under 
a false impression, I took liberty with you, which I 
now regret “ I had received,” continues Wil¬ 
kinson, “ no such letter, and interrupted him by 
observing that my ears were not open to inform¬ 
ers, and that the acknowledgment of an error 
was all that a liberal mind could desire.” Scott 
had suppressed the abusive letter, and after 
having read it to others, took this mode of pre¬ 
venting its injurious effects to himself through 
rumors reaching the General. He took the oc- 









4 


casion which the kind feeling produced by his 
frank apology, to solicit a furlough from the 
General to return to Virginia, telling him, says 
Wilkinson, that there was an “ obligation which 
imperiously required his presence in Virginia, and 
that 1 might readily conceive what delicacy forbid 
his mentioning. ” Wilkinson indulged him. 
After Scott had left the army, stating that he 
would resign and not return, Lieut. J. H. T. 
Estes, of Virginia, addressed the following note 
to General Wilkinson, to be forwarded to the 
War Department. * 

“Camp Terre Boe?df, July 9,1810.” 

“Sir: —Captain Winfield Scott having left the service 
of the United States, and I being the oldest officer in his 
absence, have had frequent applications from the greater 
part of the men now under my command for two months’ 
pay due them, to wit: September and October, 1808, 
which money I know that Captain Scott received at 
Richmond, and has not accounted to the men for, and 
herein enclose a Pay Roll, made out by Capt. W- Scott, 
for September and October, with the affidavit of the men 
present, that they have not received their money from 
him for the above mentioned time; and I do certify that 
file remarks made by me on the Pay Roll opposite their 
names are accurate and just to the best of my know¬ 
ledge. 

I am respectfully, your obedient servant, 

JOHN H. T. ESTES. 

General Wilkinson.” 

Dr. Upshaw, of Virginia, had been involved 
in a quarrel by Scott before he left New Orleans, j 
A challenge passed, but the illness of Upshaw 
up to the time when Scott left, prevented a meet- 1 
ing. When Upshaw heard of Estes’s statement, : 
he pronounced Scott’s retaining of the men’s pay j 
a robbery. He presented charges against Scott 
before a Court Martial, after Wilkinson was ! 
superseded in the command of the army by 
Hampton. The charges were: 

1. “For drawing two months of his company’s pay, j 
and withholding it from his men.” 

2. “ For seditious and insubordinate language respect¬ 
ing the Commanding General, declaring that if he should 
go into the field with him, he would carry one pistol for 
the enemy, and one for the General.” 

Upshaw prosecuted the charges, against the 
earnest solicitations of Wilkinson to desist,—the 
latter desiring to suppress a feud which at last 
ended in a duel in which Upshaw wounded Scott. 
The judgment of the Court was as follows : 

“ After due deliberation, &c., the Court find the pris¬ 
oner guilty of the first charge, but acquit him of fraud¬ 
ulent intentions—And of the second charge of speaking I 
disrespectfully of the Commanding General; but not of 
the words charged—and sentence him to one year’s sus¬ 
pension from rank, pay and emoluments.” 

Wilkinson, in his further detail of his relations 
with Scott, shows that Scott never forgave him, ! 
although the injured party, and one who still 
strove to save him from the difficulties in which 
he involved himself. When Wilkinson was put 
in command over him in 1813, in the North, 
Scott (then Colonel) again approached the Gen¬ 
eral in the same way as at New Orleans, and the 
latter again waived all explanations—told him he 
“ was ready to cmisignall to oblivion and after¬ 
wards gave him opportunities which he says 
“ excited the jealousy and discontent of senior Colonels 
in the camp,” and was finally repaid for all his 


forbearance and kindness, when he was broken 
down by ill health and misfortune, by ingratitude 
and treachery. After Wilkinson’s unlucky cam¬ 
paign, Scott came to his sick room, and there, 
says Wilkinson, “ He pressed my feeble helpless 
hand, and when I complained of my bar a yriune, 
he affected to pour balm into my afflicted boson J by 
assuring me that although his relations with General 
Hampton would prevent his saying anything against 
that officer, my conduct should be placed on its prop¬ 
er ground, and that he woxdd vindicate it against 
censure.” 

“ With these professions on his lips, which the 
Father of mercies can witness were made to me 
by Colonel Scott, he arrives at Albany, and there 
discovering that the Secretary of War had deter¬ 
mined to make me the scapegoat for the failure 
of the campaign, he yields to his secret hatred of 
a man whom he had too deeply injured to forgive, 
and forgetting my treatment of him, and his own 
voluntary promises, he outstrips the perfidy on 
the Mississippi, and, as I have been informed, 
and do verily believe, attempted in whispers to 
blast my character by imputing to me the beastly 
crime of drunkenness, at a time I labored under a 
disease that menaced my life. ” This charge was 
brought against Wilkinson, on which (as wellas 
all the other charges for which he was tried) he was 
acquitted ; and he dismisses his account of Scott’s 
various attacks on him by summing up his char¬ 
acter in these words, “ A noisy Democrat — a silent 
Federalist—a subtle tyrant, who would sooner reign 
in hell than serve in Heaven.” This was in 1817. 
Whether there is any truth in this severe opinion 
pronounced by an exasperated man, the public 
will decide, from the history of Scott’s conduct 
towards all others associated with him in public 
life—a history gleaned from public documents. 

Gen. Jackson and Gen. Scott. 

Gen. Jackson, another superior officer, became 
obnoxious to Gen. Scott’s envy and hostility. 
His exploits in the war of 1812, and his chas¬ 
tisement of the Spanish Florida Authority, and 
the British Brigands operating through the 
Seminoles, who spread havoc along our helpless 
Southern frontier in 1817, had excited against 
General Jackson the jealousy of all the aspirants 
for the Presidency, civil and military. The 
civilians assailed Jackson in Congress. General 
Scott charged him in his conversations in city 
circles and military coteries with mutiny, for is¬ 
suing a general order declaring that commands to 
his inferior officers must be made through him. 
General Jackson was informed, by an anony¬ 
mous letter from New York, of these attacks. 
He did not credit the letter, but wrote Scott a 
frank note, enclosing a copy of it to him, and 
concluded by saying, 

“ I have not, permitted myself for a moment to believe 
that the conduct ascribed to you is correct. Candor, how¬ 
ever, induces me to lay them before you , that you may 
have it in your power to say how far they be'correctly 
stated .” 

General Scott replied in an elaborate argument 
to support his charge before the public, (for his 
letter was afterwards circulated in pamphlet.) 
















5 


* 


He could not deny but that if a commanding 
General had his officers, and portions of his army 
on special service under him, ordered elsewhere 
without his knowledge, that it might be alike 
fatal to him and to the public interest committed 
to his charge. Nevertheless, by way of beard¬ 
ing General Jackson, and impressing the charge 
against him of being a Mutineer, Scott adds 
(while admitting the sound reason of Jackson’s 
orders) that “aprivate and respectful remonstrance, 
therefore, appears to have been the only mode of re¬ 
dress ivhich circumstances admitted of. Jin appeal 
to the army, or the public, before or after such re¬ 
monstrance, seems to have been a greater irregularity 
than the measure complained of—to reprobate that 
measure publicly as the division order does, was to 
mount still higher in the scale of indecorum, but 
when the order goes so far as to prohibit to all officers 
in the division, an obedience to the commands of the 
President of the United States, unless received 
through division Head Quarters, it appears to 
me that nothing but mutiny and defiance can 

BE UNDERSTOOD OR INTENDED.” 

In thus throwing down the gauntlet to Gen. 
Jackson, the champion forgot that lie was not 
dealing with General Wilkinson. Jackson took 
it up, resolved to bring it to a decisive arbitra¬ 
ment, or, at least, to give a new schooling to 
Scott in his military deportment and moral prin¬ 
ciples. 

He asks Scott, in reply— 

“ Pray, sir, does your recollection serve ? In what 
school ol' Philosophy were you taught that to a letter in¬ 
quiring into the nature of a supposed injury, clothed in 
language decorous and unexceptionable, an answer 
should be given, couched in pompous insolence and bul 
lying expression ? I had hoped that what was charged 
upon you by an anonymous correspondent was unfound¬ 
ed : I hoped so, from the'helief that General Scott was a 
soldier and a gentleman ; but when I see these statements 
directly continued by his own words, it becomes a matter ot 
inquiry how far a man of honorable feelings can reconcile 
them to himself longer to set up a claim to that character. 
Are you ignorant, sir, that had my order, at which your 
refined judgment is so extremely touched, been made 
the subject of inquiry, you might, from your standing, not 
your character, have been constituted one of my Judges? 
How very proper then was it, thus situated, and without 
any knowledge of any of the attendant circumstances, 
for you to nave prejudged the whole matter? This at 
different times, and in the circle of your friends, you 
sould do ; and yet had I been arraigned, and you detailed 
as one of my judges, with the designs of an assassin 
lurking under a fair exterior, you would have approached 
tiie holy sanctuary of justice, is cifhduct like this, con¬ 
genial with that high sense of dignity that should be 
seated in a soldier’s bosom? Is it due from a brother 
officer, to assail in the dark the reputation of another, and 
stab him at a moment when he cannot expect it? I 
might insult an honorable man by questions such as these, 
but shall not expect that they will harrow up one, who 
must be dead to all those feelings that are the characteris¬ 
tics of a gentleman.” 

And after presenting in still stronger lights “the 
abominable crime of detraction-of slandering behind 
his back a brother officer the letter concludes 
thus :— 

“ My notions, sir, are not those now taught in modern 
schools and in fashionable high life ; they were imbibed 
in ancient days, and hitherto have, and yet bear me to 
the conclusion, that he that can wantonly outrage the 
feelings of another—can intend injury where none is 
due—is capable of any crime however detestable in its 


nature, and will not fail to commit it, whenever it may 
be imposed by necessity. 

“ 1 shall not stoop, sir, to a justification of my order be¬ 
fore you, or to notice the weakness and absurdity of your 
tinsel rhetoric ; it may be quite conclusive with yourself, 
and I have no disposition to attempt convincing you, 
that your ingenuity is not as profound as you have ima¬ 
gined it to be. To my Government, whenever it may 
please, [ hold myself liable to answer, and to prove the 
reasons which prompted me to the course I took ; and to 
the inrerineddling pimps and spies of the War Depart¬ 
ment, who are in the garb of gentlemen, I hold myself 
responsible for any grievance they may labor under on iny 
account, with whom you have iny permission to num 
ber yourself. For what I have said I offer no apology ; 
you have deserved it all and more, were it necessary to 
say more. I will barely remark, in conclusion, that if 
you feel yourself aggrieved at what, is here said, any com¬ 
munication from you will reach me safely at this place. 

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient 
servant, ANDREW JACKSON. 

On this letter, Scott’s pamphlet (which is re¬ 
published in Niles’s Register, page 12b', Vol. 
NVI.) thus remarks : 

“ The foregoing extraordinary letter was laid aside 
until almost forgotten. When certain of his feelings 
Gen. Scott sat down to reply to it. He thought of New 
Orleans and some other affairs in which the parties had 
been respectively engaged, and it appeared to him that a 
brace of pistols would add nothing to the character of 
either. He conceived that at the age he had then at¬ 
tained, some little reputation for temper and moderation 
began to be an object worthy of his consideration, how¬ 
ever they might be disregarded by his opponent.” 

The Pamphlet argues this moral theme to 
some extent, and then changes the topic thus— 

‘‘Rut the foregoing letter has been represented as a 
challenge, and the reply to it, a non acceptance on the 
ground of religious scruples. The double falsehood wilt 
not escape the reader, although it be true that Gen. Scott 
in a playful humor chose to treat the letter as a chal¬ 
lenge.” 

! He then gives the letter ^which he would have 
; the reader consider one of “playful humor, , ’) in 
reply to Gen. Jackson’s, received 22d Decem- 
I ber, and which was laid aside and almost for¬ 
gotten in 10 days!! 

“ Head Quarters, 1st and 3d Military Depts., 

New York, June 2, 1818. 

“ Sir : Your letter of 3d ult. was handed me about 2'2d 
ult., and bas not been read, I might say thought o/since. 

“ These circumstances will show that it is my wish to 
reply to you dispassionately. 

“ I rdgret that I cannot accept the challenge you offur. 
Perhaps 1 may be restrained from wishing to level a pis 
tol at the breast of a fellow being in private combat by 
a sense of religion, but lest this motive should excite the 
ridicule of gentlemen of liberal habits of thinking and 
acting, I beg leave to add that I decline the honor of your 
l invitation from patriotic scruples. My ambition is not 
that of Erostratus. I should think it would he easy to 
console yourself by the application of a few epithets as 
coward, &c., to the object of your resentment, and 1 
here promise to leave you until the next war to per 
suade yourself of their truth. 

“Your famous order bears date”—Here Gen’l Scott 
runs off into a discussion of that which Gen’l Jackson 
refused to discuss with him. He touches the topic with 
much more tenderness than before, and with a variety of 
personal compliments; concluding thus— 

“ l cannot close this letter without expressing a belief 
that on the return of your wonted magnanimity, I shall 
be requested fa burn the one which has elicited it, by 
way of apology for the injury it does me—accordingly!' 
has been seen but by one individual, (of my staff,) and 
shall be held in reserve, until a certain time has elapsed 
attending that just expectation. 

“In the mean time 1 have the honor to remain, 

Sir, very respectfully, your obedient, 

W. StOTT.” 





















4 


6 


It is evident that General Jackson did not in- j 
tend his letter for a challenge ; he intended it for 
an insult. Gen. Scott had aright to charge him 
witli mutiny if he pleased—to have him tried lor 
it without affording Gen’l Jackson ground for a 
challenge. Cut his manner of accusing him in 
the circles of the cities in which he moved, thus 
trying to destroy Gen’l Jackson’s reputation,.in¬ 
sidiously, without putting him on his defence, 
was a provocation which justified the insult. 
The close of Gen. Jackson’s letter shows that 
he expected a challenge from Scott, who warily 
avoided the attitude in which the controversy 
placed him by pretending that he was the chal¬ 
lenged party. If he had even replied in the 
spirit of Gen’l Jackson’s letter without chal¬ 
lenging, it would have been an earnest, that 
whilst provoking a challenge he would meet it. 
He escaped the whole difficulty, as he supposed, 
by choosing to treat the letter as a challenge in 
a playful humor and declining it from “a sense 
of religion!”, This, he thought, would give a 
double face to the affair ; enable him to say that 
it was a double falsehood to represent the letter 
sent him as “ a challenge, and the reply to it a 
non-acceptance on the ground of religious scru¬ 
ples.” And he had a hope that by concluding 
his letter with an appeal to Gen. Jackson’s 
wonted magnanimity, to “ burn the one that 
elicited it,” the whole thing, if he succeeded 
in his scheme, would pass over quietly and in 
secret. But Gen. Jackson was not a man for 
child’s play in matters that affected his repu¬ 
tation. He lmd the magnanimity to disappoint 
Scott in his fear of the application of such epi¬ 
thets as “coward,” &c., but he had not the 
magnanimity to burn the paper in which he re¬ 
sented and repelled the attack on his military fame. 

Dewitt Clinton. 

The attack on Gen. Jackson having rather an 
unpromising look, Scott in his last letter evinced 
a desire to turn his battery on one who, he felt, 
was not so difficult to deal with as Jackson. He 
says to Gen’l Jackson : 

“Permit me to request—I think I have a right to de¬ 
mand—a sight of the original anonymous letter, which 
has given rise to this discussion. If l mistake not, your 
correspondent is perhaps a greater personage than you 
imagine—nay, so high that he has once essayed to set 
himself above the highest in our political sphere. The 
letter shall he returned as soon as the hand is compared 
with that of a certain agent of the personage alluded to.'’ 

Gen. Jackson did not lend himself to this 
scheme of hunting up anew quarrel. It did not 
accord with his old-school notions, to betray a 
correspondent who had written him the truth. 
Scott in his pamphlet (republished in Niles’s Reg¬ 
ister) says: “No reply was ever made to the 
foregoing, and of course Gen’l Scott has never 
seen the original anonymous letter. His suspi¬ 
cions and the whole correspondence were fully 
communicated in January, 1818, to a particular 
friend of Governor .Clinton, who was perfectly 
at liberty to give notice thereof to that person¬ 
age.” The pamphlet containing this passage, 
as soon as it reached Gov. Clinton, called forth 
this notice: 


TO THE PUBLIC. 

“General Scott, of the Army of the United States, hav 
ing in a letter to General Jackson, of the 2d ot January, 
insinuated that 1 had written, dictated, or instigated an 
j anonymous letter to the latter gentleman from unworthy 
j motives, or for improper purposes ; and having also con- 
| cealed this imputation from me, until the publication of a 
j pamphlet which reached me on the 4tli instant, 1 have 
! considered it proper to declare, that 1 have had no agency 
in writing, dictating, or instigating any anonymous letter 
whatever to Gen. Jackson ; that 1 am entirely ignorant 
of the author, and that the intimation of Gen. Scott is en- \ 
tirely and unqualifiedly false, to all intents and in all re¬ 
spects. This declaration is made from motives of respect 
to public opinion, and not from any regard for Gen. Scott, 
whose conduct on this occasion is such a totqj departure 
from honor and propriety as to render him unworthy of 
the esteem of a man who has any respect for himself. 

It is not probable that 1 can at this time have any recol¬ 
lection of having had the honor of seeing Gen. Scott on 
the 9th June, 1817, at a dinner in New York, or of the 
topics of conversation, as he suggests; circumstances so 
unimportant are not apt to be impressed on the memory. 
Hut l feel a confident persuasion that I did not make use 
of any expressions incompatible with the high respect 
which I entertain for General Jackson. 

DEWITT CLINTON.” 

I Albany, 6th April, 1819.” 

Gen’l Scott took this notice in so serious a 
humor that he forgot It is sense of religion , and 
! challenged Gov. Clinton to private combat, and 
i Governor Clinton treated it with the scorn it de- 
iserved. 

Scott’s Injustice to Brown, Pike, Ripley, 
Jesup, Brady, McNeill, Miller, &c. 

How strikingly does this more recent evidence 
of a jealous rivalry sacrificing every thing to a 
selfish ambition, reflect its light backwards, on 
Scott’s conduct to his comrades in the Niagara 
campaign of 1814, and develop the motives 
which prompted the injustice still done them in 
his newly published autobiography! Never was 
there such an instance of unfair dealing on the 
part of any man towards those to whom he is 
' indebted for his reputation, as is exhibited by Scott 
in the work just put forth to blazon his exploits. 

If he could deny that it is written by his own 
hand or under his dictation, the simple fact, that 
he allows the circulation of unfair fabrications to 
subserve his interests, and with the sanction of his 
silentconsent, makes him accessory to the wrong 
perpetrated against his companions in arms, for 
the most part precluded (the grave havingclosed 
over them) from vindicating their fame, but 
which will be repelled by every surviving wit¬ 
ness of the glorious scenes from which Scott’s 
biography excludes every prominent actor but 
himself. 

The autobiography 'begins the celebrated 
Niagara campaign, under this heading : “ Scott 
organizes an army.” And after assuming that 
he had everything under his command—that he 
had “ the no less important duty to perform than 
to organize, discipline, and instruct an army of 
new recruits then being mustered into the service, 
&c.” —that “we had heretofore used the Prus¬ 
sian system of tactics, Scott introduced at once, 
the far more perfect French system, &c.;” con¬ 
cluding with the self-complacent, self satisfying 
remark, that he had taken in hand a body of 













7 


raw militia without drill and without experience, 
and at the end of three months had converted 
them into a well disciplined and invincible 
corps, which soon showed itself able to conquer 
the renowned veterans of Wellington himself. 

Here is a detraction which robs some of the 
noblest names of our military annals of their 
just fame. General Pike was the first, to intro¬ 
duce the tactics and discipline of modern France 
into the American army. The hero who fell at 
York was the man who had previously created 
the model regiment of our service, and General 
Brown, who commanded in chief on the Niagara 
frontier, was the man who organized the army 
to which he was appointed, and lie planned 
and executed in person the operations of the 
campaign which covered that army with ever 
living laurels. 

The first step of the invasion of Canada was 
the summons of Fort Erie, Ingersoll, in his 
history, says : “ Major Jesup was ordered for- j 
ward with the 25th Infantry to invest the fort in 
conjunction with Ripley’s Brigade, which had 
not reached the station assigned to it. With 


Majors McCrea and Wood, he approached and 
reconnoitered the fort, which delivered some 
discharges from both cannon and musketry, 
wounding a few of Jesup’s men. Investing Fort 
Erie with his two-brigades, Brown’s good for¬ 
tune commenced by its capitulation, &c.” Gen.' 
Scott, in his autobiography, takes the whole 
credit of this auspicious opening affair. It says: 
“ Scott led the van. Fort Erie surrendered at 
discretion.” He takes frown’s plans and Jesup’s 
execution as his own, and Caesar’s veni, vidi, vici, 
for the model of his narrative; but he should 
have remembered that Caesar’s brevity owed its 
force to its truth. 


The next step in the “ Life of General Scott,” 
brings us to Chippewa, and here is an account 
•f it as embodied in himself, and made part of j 


his life: 


« The British were a well-tried and hitherto conquer¬ 
ing soldiery, possessing the advantage of a decided su 
periority of numbers, and the prestige of invincibility. 
But the daring and zealous young American general 
courted the unequal strife. Filled with martial ardor, and 
an uncalculating intrepidity, that only sought the oppor 
ttinitv to wipe out the memory of previous disaster and 
imbecility, and to exalt the glory of bis country, he 
mailed himself for the conflict. II is hopes beat high in 
the confidence of a spirit that felt determined to vvrest re¬ 
luctant victory from its favorite standard. In this hardy 
temper of soul he led forth his troops upon the plain. 
The British commander,in full reliance upon the invinci¬ 
bility of his men, anticipated his antagonist’s deterinina 
tion, and came forth to meet him. The day had passed 
in skirmishes. At five o’clock in the afternoon the com¬ 
batants drew up in battle array. The Americans coolly 
and steadily advanced in line, stretching across the 
plain from the river to the wood. The British force, in 
similar order, supported by a battery of nine cannon, con 
fronted our ranks. The attack was simultaneous and ve¬ 
hement on both sides, along the whole line. The hostile 
armies, under a destructive fire, continued to approach 
until they were within eighty yards of one another, each 
manifesting the utmost coolness and most determined 
courage. Shoulder to shoulder the American troops ad 
vanced, bravely meeting and falling before the iron tem¬ 
pest hurled in their faces by the steady masses of the 
practiced foe. The young and gallant leader was every¬ 
where along fiie line encouraging and animating his 
troops, and displaying an activity, an enthusiasm, and a 


fevrless disregard of danger, that'inspired and electrified 
his little army. While the battle raged in yet uncertain 
fury, the British line was observed to become in a measure 
broken, in consequence of its right wing having been re- 
I tarded in its advance by the wood, where it had come into 
J conflict, with Jesup’s battalion. Scott seized upon the 
| favorable moment with the eye of a veteran general, and 
| by a skilful military manoeuvre directed the whole force 
| ot his attack upon the now weakened centre of the 
enemy. The swiftness and fierceness of this movement, 
backed by a murderous fire of our artillery, caused the 
enemy’s line to waver. At this critical moment he gave 
the order to c to charge bayonet!’ The onset was terrible. 
The British columns were borne down and crushed by 
the irresistible vigor of this desperate assault. They 
broke and fled in confusion, amid terrible slaughter. 
Scott followed up his advantage with masterly activity, 
and pursued his routed adversary over the plain into bis 
intrenchments.” 

Now the reader will observe that this whole 
battle scene is filled up with “the daring and 
zealous young American General”—“ with his 
martial ardor and uncalculating intrepidity”— 

“ who mailed himself for the conflict to wipe out 
previous disaster and imbecility, and to exalt the 
glory of.his country!!” And here he tells us 
of “ the hopes which animated his bosom. His 
hopes beat high in the confidence of a spirit that 
fell determined to ivrest reluctant victory from its 
favorite standard. In this hardy temper of soul he 
led forth his troops upon the plain. ” 

Why should General Scott make such a prelim¬ 
inary parade about his secret emotions ? He car¬ 
ried his brigade gallantly into action, and why 
not let that fact speak for his courage? And 
why, after all this excelling heroism is display¬ 
ed, does he forget to say one word of the com¬ 
manding General Brown, who was on the field 
directing everything, or of the conduct of the 
other officers whose Separate corps coolly struck 
the blows that put the enemy to flight? Instead 
of doing this, he parades his courage again as 
that which electrified the whole field and sufficed 
for the whole army. “ The young and gallant 
leader icas everywhere along the line, encouraging 
and animating his troops, displaying an activity, 
an enthusiasm and a fearless disregard of danger 
that inspired and electrified his little army.” Doubt¬ 
less General Scott did his duly valiantly, but he 
forgets that it was not 11 his little army,” but Gen. 
Brown’s, and he forgets that it was bayonets led 
by Jesup, (not by the direction of Scottj who 
perceived the favorable moment with the eye of 
a skilful General and improved it, on his own 
motion ; and that it was his (Jesup’g) and Mc- 
. Neill’s admirable manceuvers enabling them to pour 
j their fire on the front and rear of the enemy, 
that decided the battle. Compare the account of 
the action as given by th<? Secretary of War, 
General Armstrong, from the official reports, 
with that taken from the “Life of Scott.” 

“The hostile armies being no fiv but about onfe mile and 
a half apart, their pickets were found soon after day-break 
engaged in skirmishing—a mode of warfare little adapted 
to Brown’s views, and one he was desirous of terminating 
in a way which should prevent his adversary from making 
a second experiment of it. To this end, while he directed 
his outlying guards to feign a flight, and thus draw those 
of the enemy into a pursuit, he detqched Brigadier Porter, 
of the New York militia, with a light corps, to march rkji- 
idly undercover of an adjoining wood and throw himself 
between the British skirmishing party and their main body.' 





















8 


In executing this order, Porter fell in with an outpost or 1 
patrol of tlie enemy, which, after acombnt of short dura¬ 
tion, he routed and was actively pursuing, when, on de¬ 
bouching from the wood he unexpectedly found himself 
in the presence of a heavy British column. We need 
scarcely add, that his retreat was necessarily sudden and 
rapid, and not discontinued until he reached the American i 
camp. 

“Though the intended manoeuvre thus failed to produce . 
the effect expected from it, it fortunately became the cause 
of another, of a character much more important - that of i 
drawing the British General and army from their fortified 
*ninp. Alarmed by the firing on his right, for the safety of 
his outlying party, and suspecting that Brown, while amu- | 
sing him with a petite guerre, in his front, really meditated ! 
an attack on his flank. Rial) hastened to assemble his J 
whole disposable force, and take a position on the plain, j 
which would better enable him to sustain his outposts and i 
hold in check any formidable movement attempted by his j 
adversary. The execution of this purpose did not escape ! 
the notice of the American General, who quickly seized j 
the occasion it offered for bringing his enemy to battle on j 
open ground, where it was justly concluded, he would be I 
more easily beaten than if posted behind,his entrench¬ 
ments. Scott was accordingly ordered to cross the bridge ' 
in his front, and with his brigade and Towson’s artillery 
to attack RialPs left—while Ripley, with the second brig¬ 
ade and Hindman’s artillery should assail his right and 
rear. 

“The former of these corps being already under arms in 
the exercise of its customary drill, was soon in motion— 
when its commander, suspecting from the detour neces¬ 
sary to Ripley’s movement, that the two attacks could 
notae made simultaneously, and inferring from the exten¬ 
ded front of the enemy, that tiie first brigade would be 
greatly outflanked, promptly ordered Major Je&up, com 
manding the 25th regiment, to throw himself forward and 
give such employment to Riall’s right, as would prevent it 
from disturbing the attack about to be made on his left.— 
This order was quickly executed, and the 25th placed at 
the short distance of one hundred yards from the British 
61ite; which had in the mean time been careful to cover 
its front with a log fence. The action soon commenced 
in parallel order, and was maintained with steadiness on 
both sides; when Jesup perceiving from the fire of the 
covered enemy in front, and his great liability to a flank 
attack from a body of Indian and Canadian militia coliec- j 
ted on his left, that the position he had taken would not 
long be tenable, gallantly determined to try theefl>ctof 
the bayonet. A charge was accordingly ordered, and ex¬ 
ecuted with its usual success; as the enemy declining to 
receive it, abandoned his position and fled in disorder. 

“The Major being now in a condition to take part in the 
main action (yet warmly contested) hastened to place Iris 
regiment across the uncovered flank of what remained of 
Riall’sline; and by an oblique fire on both its front and 
rear, was soon enabled to put another portion of it to flight. 
It was at the moment of this occurrence, that the com¬ 
manding General arrived on the field, bringing with him 
assurances of speedy support from the second brigade—a 
circumstance not even now unwelcome, but of greatly di¬ 
minished interest to the gallant men of the 1st, in as much 
as a flank movement then making [by the 11th] under the 
direction of Major McNeill, combined with Scott’s pres¬ 
sure in front, was sufficient to terminate the battle, and 
compel the enemy to withdraw behind his entrench¬ 
ments.” 

Ingersoll in his History of the War, gives the 
following account of the decisive crisis in this 
battle, which Jesif|) turned to victory; 

“The enemy considerably outnumbering, outflanked 
Scott’s line, and might have turned it, but for one of those 
inspired movements which change a perilous crisis into 
greater safety and assurance, by the near approach of 
danger. Major Jesup, at the head of the 25th regiment, 
(whose horse was shot, under him, and his men falling 
fast on the extreme left, where he contended with the 
iBritish right,) ordered his firing to be suspended, and his 
regiment to advance jvith the bayonet, in the teeth of 
deadly volleys, gained thereby a favorable position, and 
compelling their adversaries to retire from a log fence, 
behind which they stood. But driven back by Jesup’s 
gallant charge, exposed to flank as well as to front tire, 


! Major McNeill on the right, Major Leavenworth parallel te 
the enemy’s attack, meanwhile poured in their rapid and 
destructive fire, McNeill judiciously occupied an oblique 
position, and delivered his well aimed shots with fatal 
effect; and though Captain Towson’s own gun was 
thrown out of action, lie served with unabated ardor at the 
other pieces. Captain Harris, of the dragoons, (which 
corps was not made use of,) volunteered to serve out of 
his place, and had bis horse shot under him. Major 
Wood, of tne Engineers, also served as a volunteer. 
Colonel Campbell, the only officer disabled, was wounded 
as he led the lltli regiment into action. While it was 
raging, General Brown arrived and cheered the first bri- % 
: gade, with llie assurance that the second would soon 
come to its aid, which in killed and wounded had lost 
a fourth of its numbers, yet unshrinkingly continued the 
action alone.” 

Here, although Scott’s brigade alone, assisted by 
Porter’s volunteers, fought the battle, yet Brown made all 
the arrangements that preceded it. General Jesup, (as 
quoted by Ingersoll,) says, that General Brown ordered 
General Porter “to place himself between the enemy’s 
advance and his main body. To facilitate this object, our 
advance pickets were ordered to provoke a fire from the 
enemy’s pickets, and then to fall back to some log cabins 
in front of Street’s House, to induce them to follow, and 
draw, if possible, their light troops to follow in that di¬ 
rection. A heavy firing soon commenced, and continued 
for more than half an hour, when the enemy’s 
light troops were observed to be retiring, and from a cloud 
ot dust seen rising in the road leading to Chippewa Bridge, 
it was evident Riall was in motion with his principal 
force, and that he had attempted with his light troops a 
similar ruse upon us to that which General Brown had 
attempted upon him. At the time the firing had become 
so heavy, Major Jesup ordered the 25th to be ready to 
move at a moment’s notice, and mounting his horse, lie 
crossed the creek and joined General Brown. When the 
movement of Hiall was perceived, he returned immedi¬ 
ately to his place and found the regiment forming under 
arms, by order of General Scott, for exercise; (up to thirf 
time Scott had not been in battle ;) a few moments after 
the order was given by General Brown to march and 
meet the enemy.” 

Here we see Brown executing in person, all 
the manoeuvers that brought the British general 
out of his entrenched camp—ordering the battle 
—hastening on reinforcements, and before they 
could get up, flinging himself into the battle 
where raging, to encourage the troops to main¬ 
tain it. Yet Scott, his second in command, 
would, in his Biography, lead to the belief that 
there was no such man as Brown, the General- 
in-Chief, at Chippewa; and he equally forgets 
Porter, Campbell, Leavenworth, McNeill, Har¬ 
ris, Towson, Wood—all the gallant chiefs under 
him, who fought the battle, and he only men¬ 
tions Jesup’s name to make the impression that 
he ordered his decisive charge with the bayonet 
—a charge which Jesup made on his own re¬ 
sponsibility, without an order from Scott, and 
without his knowledge, until its success had 
made it apparent. 

The next step in the Biography, is Lundy’s 
Lane, and as it is the great battle which is re¬ 
lied on by Scott and his friends to close their 
.presidential campaign with victory, not a word 
of their narrative should pass without due con¬ 
sideration. 

“ Finding himself, ‘the Biography says,’ thus surprised 
into a battle against such enormous odds, he might well 
have determined to retire and await the arrival of rein¬ 
forcements under General Brown, before going into action. 
But with undaunted purpose he resolved to stand his 
ground. He however immediately dispatched an aid to 
General Brown requesting him to hasten to his assistance. 

It was now six o’clock in the afternoon. The quick eye 






















9 


of Scott discovering the opportunity, lie immediately or¬ 
dered General Jesup's battallion to turn the enemy’s 
flank. Under cover of about 200 yards of under growth, 
which concealed the operation, Jesup accomplished his 
object in a brilliant manner, and not only cut off riie left 
wing ©f the enemy, but triumphantly broke through their 
ranks, and returned into line, bearing off Mftjor General 
Riall and some other British officers prisoners The en¬ 
emy, outflanking our troops on the right, made a power¬ 
ful attempt, backed by numinous discharges of cannon, 
and favored by superior numbers, to turn our position.— 
General Scott perceiving the attempt, and intent upon 
foiling so threatening a movement, dispatched McNeill’s 
battalion to repulse the enemy. A most obstinate con¬ 
flict, conducted upon botli sides with great vehemence, 
followed. The assailants recoiled, and were punished 
with dreadful severity. Meantime the main battle of the two 
centres had joined and fought with great fierceness. The 
American line sustained with unshaken valor the whole 
weight of the enemv’s superior numbers now precipitated 
upon them with a fiery impetuosity. Our gallant band, 
though suffering prodigiously, displayed unconquerable 
resolution. The commanding presence and heroic exam 
pie of their intrepid commander, who regardless of ail 
peril, with nmvearied vigor, was foremost in every post 
ofdanger, nerved them to unparalleled efforts. The battal 
ions of Scott on this occcasion, before he was succored 
by General Brown, were dreadfully cut up. Night came 
on, and beneath the uncertain light of the moon, wading 
deep through the broken clouds, the desperate strife was 
continued. General Scott had had two horses killed un¬ 
der him, and been wounded in the side by a bullet. But 
in nowise subdued, lie rushed into the coni' st on foot, and 
continued to the end in the thickest of the fight. 

The British infantry continued to pour their deadly fire 
upon our weakened ranks, and their artillery, posted in 
a commanding position, on the crest of a neighboring 
height, which commanded the whole field of battle, at every 
discharge, thundered death upon our devoted columns. 
At length, at nine o’cloek at night, after three hours'Of 
this deadly struggle on the part of General Scott, General 
Brown arrived upon the ground with his reinforcement.— 
The enemy which, wit!) vastly superior numbers, had 
barely withstood the determined bravery or' General 
Scott’s little army, and only maintained itself in the centre 
under the guns of the artillery, was now obliged to yield. 
The regiment of the heroic Miller was deputed to the 
perilous service of silencing the British battery on the 
heights. General Scott volunteered to lead the way, and 
did so, through the darkness, up to the point of attack.— 
He then returned to favor Milter’s movement, and made 
another onset upon the British line, in which his battal 
ion suffered even more than before. After a series of 
desperate hand to hand encounters, Miller was sue 
cessful, and the batteries were silenced. 

Under the renewed furious charge of our troops the en¬ 
emy were now forced to retire, and abandon the field to 
the Americans. In one of the last of these charges, just at 
the close of the action amid terrible fighting, Scott was 
severely wounded, and had to be borne from the field.— 
This engagement incontestably established the bravery of 
our troops, and the reputation of General Scott as an offi¬ 
cer.” 

In this picture Scott is made not merely the 
principal figure, but the only important person¬ 
age on the scene. Brown, the commander-in- 
chief, whose camp was not three miles from tins* 
field, and who mounted and rode to it as soon as 
the firing was heard, met the express sent by 
Scott to him for aid—who brought up the 
second brigade and interposed it between Scott 
and the British line, throwing Scott in the rear 
as the reserve—who saw the insurmountable ob¬ 
stacle to success in the enemy’s battery, which 
had not been attacked by Scott, and should have 
been—who ordered it to be stormed—took it, 
and reformed the whole line of battle in front— 
repelled the enemy’s succession of charges, and 
finally drove him from the field, after Scott had 
again entered with his reserve, and had .been de¬ 


feated in his charge—this bold, active, skilfhl 
chief, who was in every part of the battle, and 
although shot through the thigh and in the side, 
never left it until it was won, is, in Scott’s 
sketch, nowhere to be found. But the Secretary 
; of War, Armstrong, however favorable to Scott, 
shows, from the Report of all the officers en- 
I gaged, how the victory was achieved. This is 
a con temporary notice of the event. 

Extract from Armstrong’s Notes of the War 
of 1812, vol. 11: 

“ Intelligence like this, stating a movement on the part 
of the enemy, so probable in itself, so favorable to him., 
so menacing to us, and so entirely out of Brown’s power 
to interrupt directly,could not fail to disquiettbat officer— 
who, notwithstanding, los no time in adopting the only 
measure of counteraction left him—that of a rapid march 
on the enemy’s post, in the hope that to secure these, he 
would probably recall the detachment sent, as was con¬ 
jectured, against Schlosser ” 

“ it was in executing this measure, that Scott, to whom 
the service was assigned, after a short march of two miles, 
discovered a party of British infantry near the great lulls, 
which fell back slowly on liis approach. On reaching 
Willow’s Inn, the brigadier was further imformed that 
'• Riall lav directly in his front, and was but separated from 
him by a narrow wood, intending (as was reported) to 
attack Brown’s camp at day-break the ensuing morning.’ 
A messenger being despatched to headquarters with in¬ 
formation, Scott, from the urgency of the case which had 
put him in motion,and the spirit of the orders given him, 
concluded that it was his duty to attack the enemy imme 
diaiely, without waitingtbe arrival of the second brigade ; 
and, accordingly, after detaching Major Jesup with the 
25th regiment to cover his right, he pushed rigorously 
forward through tin: wood, in his front, with the 9th, 10th , 
and 22d regiments, supported by Towson’s artillery ; and 
was engaged in a conflict, equally obstinate and san¬ 
guinary, which continued for an hour with little if any 
remission, and no decided advantage on either side. 
During this interesting period, Jesup was not unemployed. 
Finding a road leading to the enemy’s position, which they 
had either not seen or neglected to occupy, he lost no time in 
availing himself of it; and in a few minutes, was able to 
place himself on the left flank ofthe British lifie, composed 
altogether ofCanadian volunteers and militia, whom he im¬ 
mediately routed. In the pursuit which followed, several 
prisoners were made, by whom the Major was informed 
that ‘Drummond was fast advancing from Queenstown 
with a strong reinforcement, and could not now be far 
distant.’ Under this new circumstance, Jesup boldly de¬ 
termined to seize the road, and hold Drummond in check, 
till the brigades of Ripley and Porter could he brought into 
action ; nor had he been long in bis new position, when 
Major General Riall, with a large suite, fell into Ins hands. 
It being now dark, the firing in his front greatly abated, 
himself entirely uninformed of the position and views of 
the commanding General, and much encumbered with 
prisoners, be pressed cautiously forward, and in a short 
time was able to place himself on the right of Ripley’s 
brigade.” 

“During the early part of these occurrences, Genera 1 
Brown apprised, by the weight and continuity of the 
firing in his front, that the first brigade had encountered a 
force much more formidable than that of an ordinary 
picket or patrol, gave orders that the second; with Hind¬ 
man’s artillery and Porter’s volunteers, should immediate¬ 
ly move to its support. After which, setting out promptly 
himself, he joined General Scott; and finding on his ar¬ 
rival, that the ranks of this officer had been greatly 
thinned by the preceding action, and that such part of the 
corps as had eseaped wounds and death, was much ex¬ 
hausted by fatigue, he left for the moment where lie found 
it, and hastened forward with Majors McCrea and Wood 
to reconnoitre the enemy, and select ground for the in¬ 
terposition of the advancing corps. In performing this 
service, the attention of all was speedily attracted by Lie 
site given to the British artillery; which, from its greacr 
elevation, and other circumstances, gave it a complete 
command of the field of battle, and drew from the senior 
engineer a decided opinion, that £ to gain the victory, tiie 
first tiling to be done was to storm the British battery,’ 



















10 


✓ 


The commanding General, entirely coinciding in the j 
opinion, hastened to meet the advancing corps, and on j 
doing so. directed Colonel Miller to put himself at the [ 
head of the 21st regiment, and make the charge. We 
need scarcely add that the order was executed with the 
characteristic alacrity and boldness of the veteran to whom 
it was given.” 

“ Still, however decisive the appearance'of the achieve¬ 
ment at first, view, it was soon discovered that, in fact, it 
was but the signal for renewing the sanguinary conflict 
already noticed. Stimulated to new efforts by the arrival 
ef large and successive reinforcements, several bold and 
vigorous attempts were made by Drummond to recover 1 
the guns and the ground that he had lost; but in neither | 
of these could he succeed—all were repulsed by the well- 
directed fire and steady charges of the American line; 1 
which, after the first or second repulse of the enemy, had 
been increased by the shattered remains of Scott’s bri 
gade and Porter’s volunteers ; when, at last, the enemy, 
deprived as well of the example as the direction of their 
gallant leader, and lo-irgall hope of effecting their object 
by any new effort of their now diminished force, withdrew 
from the field; leaving behind them their dead, their 
wounded, and the nine pieces of artillery, for the re 
eovery of which, they had dared so much and bled so 
freely.” 

All the Reports give credit to General Scott 
for personal gallantry in this battle, and he de¬ 
serves it. Some military men have questioned 
the propriety of his attacking a much superior 
force well posted, without awaiting: the arrival 
of tlie second brigade and Porter’s militia, which 
were within three miles, and would have accom¬ 
plished in the beginning what it did at the end; 
would have taken the enemy’s battery of cannon 
and prevented the destruction it poured upon 
Scott’s brigade—keeping it at long shot, and so 
relieving the British line from the American 
musketry, and holding such a position from its 
elevation, as to render the reply of Towson’s 
artillery so ineffectual, that “ he ceased firing as 
usele>s.” However this may be, the renown 
which the General, the officers, and men of 
Scott’s brigade earned by the daring and hardi¬ 
hood displayed was worth much to the country. 
The great wrong which Scott committed was the 
effort he made, and still makes, to deprive his 
companions of their justly acquired fame, and to 
take it all to himself. A comparison of the 
Scott recital with that of Armstrong’s, makes 
manifest the attempt to deprive the commander- 
in-chief of the least share of the glory acquired; 
and the injustice done to his subordinates is not 
less remarkable. 

Major, now General Jesup, commanded the 
25th regiment. Before the battle began, he was 
“detached to the right to be governed by cir¬ 
cumstances,” as General Brown’s Diary, Secre¬ 
tary Armstrong’s Notices of the battle, andJ 
General Jesup’s own notes, quoted in Ingersoll’s 
History, aver. Being thus detached from the 
brigade, General Jesup reports, that he “ dis¬ 
covered a narrow road through the wood, which 
the enemy had either not observed or had ne¬ 
glected to occupy.” Determining to avail him¬ 
self of the advantage thus presented, he left 
Lieutenant Seymour with one light.company to j 
occuny in extended order, the whole front which 
the regiment would have covered in line, and 
advancing rapidly on the road, was soon on the 
enemy’s flank—that part of the line being com¬ 
posed of militia and'volunteers, fled in disorder 

i 


without firing a gun, and the Major placed him¬ 
self in Riall’s rear. Here he encountered several 
detachments of the enemy, all of which he 
routed, and made numerous prisoners. Whilst 
making dispositions to attack the enemy’s bat¬ 
tery in rear, Major Jesup was informed by a 
prisoner, that General Drummond was a short 
distance behind with a heavy reserve. Sensible 
that under these circumstances of the case, it 
would lie folly to attempt to carry his intentions 
into effect, and that the safety of the army de¬ 
pended upon keeping Druriimond in check, and 
keeping him out of action until General Brown 
should arrive with Ripley’s and Porter’s brigade, 
he seized the Niagara road, took a position to 
attack advantageously, every force that might 
advance, and detached Capt. Ketchum \\ ith his 
company to make prisoners all who should at¬ 
tempt to pass, either to the front or to the rear. 
General Riall and ten or- fifteen other officers, 
and among them General Drummond’s aid-de- 
camp, were'captured, with from 200 to 300 men. 

“The General with seven or eight officers was sent to 
the rear of our line, but several officers and nearly all the 
private soldiers escaped. We had, however, deprived 
them of their arms. It had now become quite dark, and 
the firing had partly ceased, when about twenty minutes 
after Riall had been sent off the field, G< neral Scott’s 
command gave three cheers, which drew a heavy fire 
from the enemy. Major Jesup moved with his command 
slowly and silently towards the rear, keeping a fence be¬ 
tween his line and the Niagara road. He had proceeded 
but a short distance, when he was informed that troops 
were advancing, and he soon met Captain Biddle, of the 
artillery, from whom he received the pleasing intelligence 
that General Brown had arrived with his whole force, and 
was about to renew the action. Not knowing where to 
find General Brown or General Scott, or where to apply 
for orders, Major Jesup decided to resume his former po¬ 
sition in the rear, and he had nearly attained it, when lie 
met a part of the enemy’s force advancing, which he 
attacki d and routed with great slaughter. A few mo¬ 
ments previously, a heavy firing on and near the heights 
announced that our troops had attacked the enemy thero. 
General Brown then approached Major Jesup and in¬ 
formed him that Colonel Miller had carried the heights 
with the bayonet, and had taken the enemy’s artillery. 
By his order the Major fell hack and joined Gen. Ripley, 
outlie heights, by whom he was posted with his com¬ 
mand on the right of the line which was then forming. 
The enemy gave us but little time to rest ; he advanced 
in line, supported by a heavy reserve, evidently with the 
intention of charging; his left was almost in contact with 
the 25th before the firing commenced. Our troops took 
deliberate aim, and our fire was so terrible, that in a few 
minutes his line recoiled—then broke, and officers and 
men fled from the field. Our line was adju-ted, and the 
cartridges taken fiom the soldiers who had been killed 
and wounded, and distributed among those who re¬ 
mained unhurt. In about half an hour, the enemy ap¬ 
proached again in great force, and in good order, and I 
alter a severe conflict, which lasted fifteen or twenty! 
minutes, he broke and again fled from the field. Major 
Jesup, who, about the time General Ritfll was taken, had 
received a wound by a ball passing through the right 
shoulder, received a slight wound in the neck, and a shot 
through the right hand. In a short time the enemy was 
again seen to be advancing apparently with undiminished 
! force. To preserve the 25tli, Major Jesup was obliged 
to form his men in a single rank, and to put all the file* 
in closer order in to that rank. The contest was now more 1 
obstinate than any ol the previous attacks of the enemy; I 
for half an hour the blaze from the muskets of the tvvo 
lines mingled ; but ours was so well direeted, and so da- 1 
structive. that the enemy was again compelled to retire. I 
During this contest, General Scott joined the 25th, and 1 
whilst conversing with Major Jesup received a wound in [ 
tiie iett shoulder, which compelled him to leave the field. 
General Brown soon after approached, ami enquired for 


















11 


General Scott, wishing to devolve on him the command, ! 
as he was severely wounded; but being informed that] 
General Scott was wounded also, he retired. Major Jesup 
soon after received a contusion on the breast by a piece | 
of a shell, or perhaps the stock of a rocket, which brought 
him to the ground; in a few minutes, however, he rose j; 
and resumed his command, which had temporarily*le- i 
volved on Captain Murdock, in this attack, Captain ; 
Kinney and Ensign Hunter of the 25th, were killed, and 1 
Lieutenants Sholer, McChard and Dewitt, were severely j 
wounded. So sanguinary had the last conflict been, that, 
when it terminated, Major Jesup found a considerable j 
interval between his corps and the troops on the left of 
him.” 

The reader of the various narratives, especially 
the testimony before the court, by which the 
whole affair of Ripley’s case was investigated, 
will find Jesup’s statements verified at all points, j 
which indeed are not contradicted. But it will 
be perceived that Scott appropriates all Jesup’s j 
independent action, and that “skill” which 
President Madison blazons in the brevet com-I 
mission with nis own pen which made him a 
colonel,—the consummate skill which availed j 
itself of circumstances of which Scott knew 
nothing, which captured General Ria.ll, defeated 
the provincial militia—of all of which “ the 
quick eye of Scott” saw nothing, and could not, 
therefore, have discovered the opportunity of 
attacking—which held Drummond in check, 
although Scott had no knowledge of his ap¬ 
proach—all this important service which Jesup j 
rendered, preventing Scott’s brigade from being 1 
overwhelmed before Brown brought up the other j 
two brigades, General Scott assumes was the | 
work of “ his own quick eye discovering an op¬ 
portunity.” 

This arrogation of all the honors of the field by 
General Scott was not confined to Gen. Jesup. 
Although it was his (Scott’s) duty to report of j 
the conduct of the officers and of the several corps 
under his command, that they might be rewarded 
according to their merit, lie evaded what would ] 
•have been the most grateful function to a man of 
generous heart, where those supporting him had l 
exhibited ability and heroism of which Caesar i 
himself might have been proud to make a boast. 
But Scott wished to engross all, and would do ! 
nothing therefore to make anybody conspicuous 'j 
but himself. Instead of devoting himself to what ! 
was his official, and ought to have been a most j 
grateful duty—making a report of the conduct of 
the men and officers who had foughtand won the j 
battle, he went from city to city making an exhi- | 
bition of himself like the Irish«giant, as though 
heroes were to be measured by feet and inches. | 

The Pictorial History produces him in :>ne of its 
wood cut prints as appearing on this tour, on the 
stage at Princeton College, playing the part of 
the model hero before the ingenuous youth of that j 
celebrated Institution. But while thus appropri- J 
ating to himself the renown of Lundy’s Lane, 
Gen. Scott was forgetful of the noblest attribute j 
of the hero—he forgot the brave comrades whose 
blood bought the achievement—Jesup, whose | 
hand was torn to fragments, whose shoulder was i 
perforated by a ball, who was wounded in the 
neck by another, and whose breast was bruised 
by j,he fragment of a shell—McNeill, who was j 


shot through the knee and the whole limb stif¬ 
fened for life—Brady, covered with wounds, but 
who still lingered on the field to encourage others 
when he could no longer fight—Leavenworth, 
who rallied Scott’s broken regiment after the last 
charge, when the General himself had abandon¬ 
ed it and thrown himself into Jesup’s regiment, 
which maintained its position—Worth, his own 
aid, dangerously wounded and borne from the 
field, in which he had distinguished himself by 
his gallantry—all those who lived and would have 
enjoyed his praise, and those who died to deserve 
it, were forgotten by their General in his exulta¬ 
tion. He made no report of their .deeds to the 
Commanding General or to the country. The 
consequence of this omission was deeply but si¬ 
lently felt by the officers of Scott’s brigade.— 
General McNeill however, having hobbled down 
to advanced age, with his whole limb from the 
hip to the foot, converted into what was but little 
better than a stick of timber, felt authorized by 
his necessities, to apply to Congress for a pen¬ 
sion, doingso however, most reluctantly. There 
was no official report setting forth his service 
and suffering to justify his appeal. To supply 
the want, he induced the Committe on Pensions 
to call out testimony in 1845* by letter from Gen. 
Jesup, one of the few surviving field-officers of 
the Brigade. The reply of General Jesup to the 
chairman of the Committee, with the letter en¬ 
closing it to Gen. NcNeill, saves the trouble of 
all comment on the injustice and ingratitude of 
General Scott. 


My Dear General— 


Louisville, Kentucky, 
January Itith, 1845. 


Agreeably to my promise, I enclose you a copy of a 
letter I addressed to the Hon. Mr. Phelps, of the Com¬ 
mittee on Pensions of the Senate, in answer to a letter 
from him making inquiries as to your services in the late 
war. 1 also.enclose you, in the form of a memoir, an 
abstract from my journal kept during the campaign on the 
Niagara in 1814; which, though not so lull as I could 
have made it, from the abundance of my notes, had I been 
able to devote more time to the subject, 1 flatter myself 
will be satisfactory to you, from the fact that it notices 
your admirable manoeuvre at Chippewa, in. the’precise 
language in which 1 recorded it at the time. And 1 now 
proceed, in compliance with your request, to give you, iq 
as few words as possible, an account of what occurred 
between our late friend Leavenworth and myself, when it 
was ascertained that General Scott had left for Europe, 
without having reported the niovemems and operations 
ot his brigade at Lundy’s Lane, or taken any measures to 
cause justice to be done to those who commanded the 
regiments which composed it. The action of Congress on 
the subject of rewarding the several officers who were 
acknowledged by the government and the country to have 
distinguished themselves, when known to us, was ex¬ 
tremely mortifying to us all. I felt, perhaps, the more 
keenly the course adopted by Congress towards us, from 
the fact that General Brown had, in ins report ot the 
battle at Lundy s Lane, classed me with Generals Scott 
and Porter, and Colonel Miller. On all of whom, Medals 
and the thanks of the nation had been conferred. In the 
autumn of 1815, Leavenworth wrote to me in relation te 
the neglect and ihjustice with which we had, in his 
opinion, been treated; and urged the necessityof immediate 
measures to have ourselves righted, lie insisted that we 
were all entitled to as? much as any, except General 
Brown, who had received the high rewards of the nation. 
You iiad, on your own responsibility and without orders 
from any one, made a decided movement at i hippewa, 
and had rallied the portion of the brigade that first broke 
at Lundy’s Lane. Leavenworth had, at the Litter place, 

























rallied the fragments of the brigade, formed and brought 
k back into action, when having been placed, by the 
headlong, but indiscreet, valor of General Scott, underthe 
fire of our own line as well as that of the enemy, it had 
broken and fled. I had made a decisive and effective 
movement at Chippewa; and had adopted and carried 
out, on my own responsibility, a series of movements and 
manoeuvres at Lundy’s Cane, by which I succeeded in 
turning General Riall, made him and several of his officers 
prisoners; and checked the movements of General 
Drummond’s division, and keptitout of action until Gen. 
Brown had reached the field with Porter’s and Ripley’s 
brigades, by which Gen. Scott was saved from disastrous 
defeat. What you and Leavenworth had done was not 
noticed at all. But Gen. Brown having witnessed my ! 
closing operations, noticed them in his report. So far as 
concerned us all, Leavenworth blamed General Scott: 
and so far as related to all but me, he blamed General 
Brown. When Leavenworth wrote to me, General Scott 
was in Europe—his omission to report the operations of 
his brigade, I ascribed to accident or inadvertence, not 
to design ; and 1 assured Leavenworth of my belief, that 
he would voluntarily do us full justice on his return. I 
declined, when called upon by Leavenworth, to unite with 
you and him in asking justice at the hands of General 
Scott after his return ; or in taking any measures to bring 
the matter to the notice of Congress; because I felt that 
[ had contributed fully as much as General Scott had to the 
brilliant victories achieved on the Niagara frontier; and 
much more than some of those'on whom the legislature had 
lavished the highest honors of the country; and f could 
not consistently with a proper self-respect be a suppliant 
for that which I had fairly won—neither did I believe that 
either of you could. 'Besides, I believed (as i expressed 
myself in my letter to Leavenworth at the time) that no 
national distinction was worth possessing which was not 
spontaneously bestowed, in accordance with the public 
voice. General Scott was bound, as a man of honor, to 
place us all fairly before the government and thecountry. i 
had entire confidence that he would do so. You and 
Leavenworth doubted—time, that tests all things, has 
shown which was right. No report, l believe, has yet 
been made by General Scott. General Brown, about a 
week before bis death, declared to me that General Scott 
had not, up to that time, furnished him with any account 
of the operations of his brigade at Lundy’s Lane; and 
assigned that as a reason for not mentioning you, Brady, 
and Leavenworth—iie added that he reported nothing in 
relation to me but what passed under his own eye. 1 have 
made inquiry of the representatives of General Brown, 
and also of the Adjutant General of the Army, and from 
both the answer is, that no report of General Scott, in 
relation to the operations of his brigade at Lundy’s Lane 
is to he found. 1 take it for granted he made none, and it 
will be for him to explain how, owing, as he does, his 
brilliant reputation to our exertions more than to his own, 
he has committed the injustice of remaining solongsilent. 

Pressed for time, and separated from most of my papers, 

I have not been able to answer your inquiries as f ully, 
perhaps, as you expected, and as 1 desired. Should I live 
to return to Washington, I will answer more in detail, 
in the meantime, remain, most cordially, yours, 

(Signed.) T. S. JESUP. 

Gen. John McNeill, 

Late of the Jinny, Boston, Massachusetts. 


Quartermaster General’s Office, 
Washington City, January 2,1840. 

Sir : I have received your note requesting information 
on the subject oi General McNeill’s services in the cam¬ 
paign on the Niagara in 1814, it affords me sincere 
pleasure to bear testimony to the meritorious and gallant 
conduct of that officer. 

At the battle of Chippewa, the 1st brigade, composed of 
the 9th, 11th, and 25th regiments, and a small detachment 
of the 22d, had to pass the bridge over Street’s creek, 
under the fire of a British battery. Gen. McNeill, then a 
Major, was second officer of the 11th; but before it bad 
taken its place in the line, be succeeded to the command 
of it, by the fall of Col. Campbell. I followed the 11th 
with my command across tiie bridge—and being ordered 
to the left, 1 was obliged to pass in rear of it to attain my 
position, i bad, therefore, an opportunity of witnessing 
the conduct of Gen. McNeill from the time we marched 
from our camp until I passed the left of his lim# then 


engaged in deadly conflict—he formed his regiment under 
the fire of the enemy, with the accuracy ol parade, and 
such was his perfect self-possession, that every word of 
command he gave could be distinctly heard f ar beyond h is 
own line. He promptly availed himself of every advantage 
presented by the ground and the errors of the enemy— 
and wielded his force with as much coolness nd judg¬ 
ment, as the accomplished chess player disp.ays in the 
movement of his pieces on the chess board. The enemy 
was beaten, and he certainly contributed as much to the 
victory as any other man on the field. 

At the battle of Bridgewater, General McNeill led his 
regiment into the field with his accustomed gallantry, and 
formed on the ground assigned to him, under the fire of a 
British battery of nine pieces of artillery. There his 
regiment, as well as the brigade of which it formed a 
part, was literally cut to pieces—grape and canister were 
poured upon them like hail—and though they were placed 
too far from the enemy to act with decisive effect, and 
were opposed with superior numbers, the conflict was 
maintained more than an hour, until General Brown 
arrived on the field with Ripley’s and Porter’s brigades. 
General McNeill was severely wounded. 1 was on 
another part of the field ; hut I was informed at the time 
that his horse had been killed under him, and that a can¬ 
ister shot had passed through his leg. The officers who 
commanded tiie regiments of the second brigade, have 
received the highest honors of the nation, or of their re¬ 
spective States, while those who commanded the regi¬ 
ments of the first brigade have, with a single exception, 
(General Brady) remained unnoticed; this is perhaps to 
he ascribed to the fact, that the commander of the brigade, 
wiio owes to it his whole reputation, has not to this day 
reported its operations at Bridgewater. 

I have the honor to be, Sir, your obedient servant, 

(Signed,) T. S. JESUP. 

The lion. S. Phelps, Senate U. S. 

There is one point made in Scott’s autobiog¬ 
raphy which characterizes the man more than 
any other in the whole book. He sees note what 
he ought to have seen, but did not see at the 
very threshold of the battle of Lundy’s Lane.— 
The British battery of cannon placed with great 
skill on the crest of a hill, commanded the whole 
slope by which our army was to approach it, 
and Towson’s battery could not counteract it, 
from its position under the hill. Leavenworth in 
his testimony in Ripley’s case, says : “Col.Tow.- 
son finding fromthe elevated situation of the ene¬ 
my’s artillery, that he could not bring his artillery 
to bear upon them, had nearly or quiie ceased 
firing.” At the beginning of the battle all he 
could do with his battery was to animate our troops 
to stand by the thunder of his guns. Leaven- i 
worth pays : “The company of artillery under 
the command of Colonel (then Captain) Tow- 
son, an officer'above any encomium, was moved 
up and formed on the right of the 9th regiment, 
and by its frequent and incessant discharges highly j 
animated the spirit of our troops. ” And this was j 
all he could do in the position in which he was i 
placed. They stood and were shot down, and I 
fired lo animate the infantry to stand and be shot j 
down. And this continued to he the case until j 
Gen. Brown came and saw that the battery must i 
beGaken or the whole army sacrificed. Scott 
sees that noio, although he did not see it when he 
might have preserved his gallant brigade by rush¬ 
ing on the battery, with the bayonet in the begin¬ 
ning, instead of standing 200 or 300 yards off, ply¬ 
ing it ineffectually with musketry, and equally 
ineffectually with artillery. He sees it now, 
when the author and executor of this decisive 
charge are in their graves, and he endeavors to 






















13 


■-v-- 

strip them both of the merit of the achievement. 
He says : “The regiment of the heroic Miller 
was dispatched on the perilous service of silen¬ 
cing the British battery on the heights. Gen. 
Scott volunteered to lead the way, and did so 
through the darkness, up to the point of attack.” 
This is out and out a shameful falsehood. We 
have in the autobiography a wood-cut with Scott 
on horseback leading Miller’s regiment to the 
attack. Now, of the survivors of that battle two 
are in Washington city, and will both testify, 
that Scott was never heard of before in connec¬ 
tion with that charge. He was thrown back 
some five .hundred yards from the heights to 
gather his broken brigade, and while he was thus 
employed*. Brown interposed Porter’s and Rip¬ 
ley’s brigades and took the battle into his own 
hands. It was at this crisis, when Scott, was out 
of the battle entirely, that Brown’s first move¬ 
ment was to storm the battery. Brown says 
himself that McCrea, of his staff and principal 
engineer, suggested it as soon as they were in 
the field. Ripley also saw the necessity of it 
and mentioned it to Miller, and Miller’s letter to 
Brown proves that the General-in-chief personally 
gave the order. Miller, in a letter to Brown, 
says : “The fact is, after receiving from your¬ 
self the order to §torm and take the enemy’s bat¬ 
tery, I obeyed it as soon as possib^^with my 
regiment.” In Ripley’s trial, whewBhis point 
is closely scanned as the leading incident of the 
battle, Scott is not mentioned as being consulted 
even, much less acting in it. 

Scott’s Injustice to Van Rensellaer, Wool, 
&c. 

The same spirit of monopoly characterizes 
the account of every transaction of the war of i 
1812, with which General Scott had any connec¬ 
tion, and which is made to figure with the recent j 
pictorial illustration of his life. The battle of | 
dueenstown Heights was fought by Colonel Van j 
Rensellaer, and after he fell, wounded by several J 
balls, by Captain, now General Wool, who, | 
with Captain Ogilvie, stormed the British batte- i 
ries. The battle had begun “a few minutes be- J| 
lore daybreak,” and the heights were taken and ij 
the batteries stormed (in the process of which the jj 
British Commander-in-chief, General Brock, was 
killed) between three and four o’clock in the af- j 
ternoon. “About this time,” says General Wool, 
which was between three and four o’clock in the 
afternoon, Lieutenant Colonel Christie arrived || 
and took the command.” There had been, 
after the flight of the British on the death of* | 
Brock and the storming of the batteries, a ces¬ 
sation of the conflict. It was then that Lieu- j| 
tenant Col. Scott crossed the river and ap- j 
peared on the scene of action, and Armstrong, : 
the Secretary of War, thus notices the share he 
had in it : 

“ Between two and three o’clock, P. M., a scattering 
fire was heard on the southern side of the heights, pro¬ 
duced by an Indian attack made on a small party of strag- J 
gling militia; who being completely surprised, tied in 
great confusion, and carrying their panic along with them, | 
threatened to extend the infection to other corps. Jt was , 
at this critical moment, that Lieut. Colonel Scott, of the 


Second Regiment of Artillery, placing himself at the 
head of a tew platoons of regular troops, charged the 
savages with a gallantry which soon checked, and at 
length, drove them into a neighboring wood ; where the 
combat became nearly stationary, and a mere trial of 
skill at sharp shooting. Perceiving that a champ de bat- 
taille like this, secured to the Indians all the advantages 
of their habitual and peculiar inode of fighting, while to 
his own troops it produced effects directly the reverse, 
the Lieut. Colonel prudently withdrew his party to the 
open ground, and there took a position, which, though it 
did not entirely put an end to the attack, nro.de it too in¬ 
efficient, longer to disturb the order of the American 
line.” 

“ A discovery was, however, soon made, that the 
savages were not the only enemy the invading corps 
would have to contend with. From the heights of 
Queenstown, in the distance eastward, was now seen 
advancing a column of artillery and infantry. Its ap¬ 
proach, though slow and circumspect, was steady and 
unremitting; and of its character and objects there could 
be no doubt. About three o’clock, P. M., Gen. Sheafe, 
the successor of Brock, and leader of the column, after 
turning the village and throwing into it a detachment 
competent to its defence, presented himself and a foroe 
of eight hundred regulars, militia and Indians, in front of 
the American line—now reduced to less than three hun¬ 
dred combatants, and sustained but by a single piece of 
artillery badly supplied with ammunition.” 

“The British commander in the meantime continued 
to maneuver from right to left, and from left to right; 
countermarching nearly the whole length of the American 
line twice, as if determined to count every man in the 
ranks, and to make himself familiar with every foot of the 
position, before lie hazarded an attack. This delibera¬ 
tion on his part, gave time for renewed councils on that of 
his adversary; and a second consultation being held, a 
determination was at last taken to try the experiment of a 
retreat, as recommended by General Van Rensselaer. 
To have executed successfully a purpose of this kind, in 
the face of an enemy so much more formidable than 
themselves, in numbers, discipline and variety of arms, 
would have been no easy task for soldiers the most pre 
tised, officers the most skilful; but was perfectly hopeless 
whejn required from American levies, who had seen only 
an imperfect service of three or four months. The result 
was such as might have been, and probably was antici¬ 
pated by the reflecting portion of the corps; the first step 
taken in retreat, produced a movement on the part of the 
enemy, which at once converted the march into a route; 
and (superadded to the fact, that not a boat was found on 
the shore ready to receive them) made necessary^n im¬ 
mediate and unconditional surrender.” 

This is the clear and succinct account of all 
that occurred after Scott joined the assailants of 
Queenstown. He did not cross from the Ameri¬ 
can shore until after the field was won, the bat¬ 
tery stormed, the British General and his aid 
killed, and the British force driven oft’, which 
cost a series of struggles beginning at dawn and 
continuing until between three and four in the 
afternoon. In the various conflicts, Col. Van 
Rensellaer had six balls shot through him, 
wounding him in the hip, thigh, and leg ; but he 
continued in command as long as he could stand. 
Lieutenant Valleau and Ensign Morris were 
killed, Lieutenant Rathbone, Captain Armstrong 
(son of the Secretary,) and Captain (now Gene¬ 
ral) Wool, were severely wounded ; Captain 
Ogilvie, Lieutenant Kearney, (late General,) 
Lieutenants Randolph, Carr, and Hugenin, and 
Ensign Riel are all reported to have greatly dis¬ 
tinguished themselves. Captain Nelson was 
mortally wounded at another point, and Lieut. 
Col. Fenwick, Lieutenants Phelps and Clark, 
and their whole party cut to pieces. The hard 
service of crossing the rapid Niagara, under the 
fire of the enemy—scaling the almost perpen- 


















14 


dicular heights of Queenstown—storming the 
batteries ; in a word, the bloody work was | 
done, and almost all the officers who achieved j 
the victory, festering in their wounds, when I 
Col. Scott and Col. Christie—the latter took 
command—came on the field. They did well. 
They had a skirmish with a party of Indians, 
drove them into the woods, and then returned 
to their position, the Indians following. Here 
they remained until the British General Sheafe, 
with a superior force from Fort George, surroun¬ 
ded and compelled them to surrender. But is 
this momentary skirmish with the Indians, re¬ 
treat and surrender, to eclipse all the heroism of 
almost a whole day’s struggle with Brock at the 
head of England’s best troops, and the battle 
which England immortalized on her own soil 
by a lofty monument, built on the spot where 
Brock fell, and overlooking two lakes—is this 
proud trophy which it cost the blood of so many 
brave men to earn, to be absorbed by Scott’s 
skirmish with a handful of Indians, emerging 
from the woods, drawing him out and driving 
him in again? Or was the speech from the log, 
which is given now with all the finish of Livy, 
and which produced the resolution, 'never to sur¬ 
render —but which was immediately followed by 
a surrender —to outweigh the resolution which 
did all the hard fighting? Is Scott’s eloquence 
on a log to give him all the glory of the field ? 
It seems so, for in the new life with wood-cuts, 
every body is to be put out of the way, and 
Scott made to figure as the commander-in-chief-— 
tl»e Life stating on Scott’s arrival that “ tlie en¬ 
tire command of the corps, 600 strong, was at once 
committed to him.” This happens to be an en¬ 
tire falsehood. General Wadsworth being, as 
Armstrong states, “the senior officer in the 
field ” at the close of the day, and Wool, who 
commanded until the batteries were stormed, 
andjhe himself shot, states expressly, that he 
was first superseded by Christie, who ranked 
Scott. His report closes thus: “ The wounded 
and prisoners 1 ordered to the guard house, about 
this time which was between 3 and 4 o’clock in the 
afternoon. Lieut Colonel Christie arrived and took 
command. lie ordered me across the river to get 
my wounds dressed. I remained a short time. Our 
flanking parlies had been driven in by the Indians, 
but General Wadsworth and other officers arriving, 
we had a short skirmish with them, and they recoil¬ 
ed and I crossed the river.” 

From this it is evident that the Life, not con¬ 
tent with taking all the credit of the fight for | 
Scott, takes also the honor of the command, to 
which he was as little entitled. 

Scott’s Injustice to General Dearborn, 

General Lewis, and Com. Chauncey. 

The next display in the Pictorial History, is 
the taking of Fort George. We have two engra -1 
vings—one, “ the battle of Fort George,” which 
exhibits a furious onset ot swords and musketry 
—the other, the feat of “ Scott tearing down 1 
the Flag.” Now here is the full account of the 
whole affair as given by General Armstrong 


who is partial to Scott, and inimical to Dearborn, 
wiio commanded the expedition :— 

“ It was not till the 8th of May, that they arrived off 
“ Fort George: nor until the 27th, that they were suffi- 
“ ciently prepared for the attach of that post. At lour 
“ o’clock, A. M. of this day, the batteries on tlie American 
“side of the Niagara being ready for action, the means 
“ necessary for transportation provided, and considerable 
“ reinforcement of troops drawn from Saekett’s Harbor— 
“ (now amounting to nearly six thousand combatants,) 
“ began their movements in boats, along the lake shore, 
“ to Two Mile Run, the point .le-dgnated for a general 
“ landing. When abreast of thi°, they rested on their 
“ oars, till the armed vessels had severally taken their 
“ covering positions, and thesignal had been given forties- 
“ cent; after which resuming the movement, they pressed 
“ vigorously forward to the shore. At nine o’clock, the 
“ light infantry commanded by Colonel Scott, effected a 
“ landing; and' being speedily supported by Boyd’s brigade, 
“ and a well directed fire from the shipping were soon en- 
“ abled to surmount the bank, break down the enemy’s 
“ line in their front, and compel its scattered parts to fly 
“ in the direction of Newark and Fort George. 

“ On approaching these, Vincent, the British comm an- 
“ der, finding the former in tlie flames, and the latter, nearly 

if not altogether untenable, wisely determined to hazard 
“ a retreat in the face of his enemy, and thus by deserting 
“his post, multiply the chances of saving tlie garrison.— 
“ Fortunately for him, a contingency of this kind was 
“ neither provided for in the original plan of attack, nor 
“ by subsequent order given on the field ; and would per- 
“ haps have entirely escaped notice, had not Scott from 
“ his advanced position, made the discovery, and deemed it 
“ his duty to institute and conti mie in a pursuit of five miles; 
“ not merely without orders, but in evasion of such as were 
“ given, until at last a mandate reached him, of a character 
“so decided and peremptory as by leaving nothing to 
“ discretion, could not lail io recall hint to Fort Georgo.” 

Tlie only shew of fight made by the British 
was made at the landing, which is thus described 
by Commodore Chauncey who did all the execu¬ 
tion. He is quoted by Armstrong, thus : “ All 
the vessels anchored within musket shot of the 
shore, and in ten minutes after they opened on 
the [water] batteries, they were completely si¬ 
lenced and abandoned.” Again : “The enemy 
who had been concealed in a ravine, now ad¬ 
vanced in great force to the edge of the bank to 
charge our troops [when] the schooners opened 
so well directed and tremendous a fire of gi^ape 
and canister, that they [the enemy,] soon re¬ 
treated from the bank.” 

The British arrayed to oppose Scott’s landing 
on the bank, were met with “so tremendous a 
fire of grape and canister, that they soon re¬ 
treated.” 

General Dearborn who commanded, in his of¬ 
ficial account to the Secretary, shews who took 
Fort George. He says : 

“Commodore Chauncey had made the most judicious 
arrangements for silencing the enemy’s batteries near the 
pointof landing. The army is under the greatest obliga¬ 
tion to that able naval commander for bis co operation in 
all its important movementsand especially in its operations 
tbisday. Our batteries succeeded in rendering FortGeorge 
untenable, and when the enemy had been driven from his 
positions and found it necessary to re enter it, after firing 
a few guns and setting fire to the magazines, which soon 
exploded, he moved off rapidly by different routes—our 
light troops pursued them several miles.” 

Here is General Morgan Lewis’s account of 
the affair, lie commanded all the c'rps \yhose 
landing was covered by Chauncey’s guns: 
















“On the Field, 1 P. M., 27th May, 1813. 

Dear Sir : —Fort George and its dependencies are ours. 
The enemy beaten at all points, has blown up his magazines 
and retired. It is impossible at this moment to say any 
thing of individual gallantry—there was no man who did 
not perform his duty in a manner which did honor to him¬ 
self and country. Scott’s and Forsyth’s commands sup¬ 
ported by Boyd’s and Winder’s brigades sustained the 
brunt of the action. Our loss is trifling—perhaps not more 
than twenty killed and over that number wounded. The 
enemy has left in the hospital 124, and sent several on 
board the fleet. We have also made about 100 prisoners of 
the regular forces. 

I am, dear sir, most respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, * 

MORGAN LEWIS. 

Major General Dearborn, 

Com. in Chief of the Northern Army.” 

Fort George was abandoned at the moment of 
the landing, and if the cetemony of tearing down 
the flag was left for Gen. Scott to do with “ his 
own hands,” it is not found in any of the official 
reports, in which Scott would have been careful 
to have had it inserted, if the fact would justify it. 
Every body who knows any thing of him knows 
that he would insist upon such an exploit of pa¬ 
geantry, especially as there was little else left to 
boast of. The fighting and execution were done by 
Chauncey, by whose broadsides the British were 
out up. Yet like Gen.Dearborn and General Lew¬ 
is, he is omitted in Scott’s memoir, except only 
to say, that the “ debarkation alone of the troops | 
was covered by the little fleet Commodore | 
Chauncey.” From this no one would suppose 
that the enemy were driven to retreat by his 
guns, leaving nothing but the chase to Scott. 

President Madison supplanted by 
General Scott. 

The war of 1812 was declared to protect our I 
native and naturalized citizens from British im- 1 
pressment. The British government asserted j 
the right of impressment solely upon the pretext 
that a British subject could not expatriate him¬ 
self, or by swearing allegiance to the United lj 
States, exonerate himself from the authority of jj 
his native country. Every Englishman, Scotch¬ 
man or Irishman found on board our ships was 
under this pretext, made liable to be impressed. | 
Our Government resolved to encounter all the ; 
calamities of war in resistance to this principle, j 
which in practice was made a cover under which 
to drag native born Americans as well as natural- 
ized citizens, from our ships. As soon as the 
war commenced, the British government pushed 
their principle to its necessary consequence, and 
proclaimed every man who had been a British 
subject, a traitor if he bore arms in defence of 
the United States, his adopted country. Follow¬ 
ing up this doctrine, the first prisoners taken by 
England were winnowed for these traitors, and 
our naturalized citizens found among them were 
put in irons and sent home, as it is called, to be 
tried for high treason. The- first case occurred 
in August, 1812. On the 1 Sih ot October, 1812, 
the Wasp which had captured the British ship 
Frolic was taken by the British 71, Poictiers.— 
Niles’s Register, vol , p. 223 

Noticing the progress the B-’ i Lh were making 
in seizing our adopted citizens as traitors, an of-; 


ficer of the U. S. Sloop AVasp, says in a letter , 
that*“the boatswain of that ship and some of the 
crew have been detained at Bermuda on suspi¬ 
cion of being British subjects, with a view to try 
them for treason. This is the third case in which 
some of our sailors have been detained on this 
plea. The two former were promptly met by 
putting into close confinement twice the number so 
held by the enemy, as hostages for the safety of 
our people, and we trust the like procedure will 
prevail in this instance, as well as that punish¬ 
ment may be inflicted, pari passu, in all cases and 
at every hazard. General Washington was re¬ 
luctantly compelled to adopt this line of conduct 
during the revolution.” 

General Scott takes to himself, in his auto¬ 
biography, the credit of having first established 
this retaliatory system in favor of our adopted 
citizens, by bringing his personal influence to 
bear on Congress in 1813!! But let us hear 
what Mr. Madison says on this subject in his 
Message of 1812. 

Extract from the President’s Message : 

“The British commander in that Province, neverthe¬ 
less, with the sanction, as appears, of his government, 
thought proper to select from American prisoners of war, 
and send to Great Britain, for trial, as criminals, a num¬ 
ber of individuals who had emigrated from the British 
dominions long prior to the state of war between the two 
nations, who had incorporated themselves with our poli¬ 
tical society i u the modes recognized by the law and prac¬ 
tice of Great Britain, and who were made prisoners of 
war under the banners of their adopted country, fighting 
for its rights and its safety. 

“The protection due to these citizens requiring an 
effectual interposition in their behalf, a like number of 
British prisoners of war were put into confinement, with 
a notification that they would experience whatever vio¬ 
lence might be committed on the American prisoners of 
war sent to Great Britain. 

“ It was hoped that this necessary consequence of the 
step unadvisedly taken on the part of Great Britain, would 
have led her government to reflect on the inconsistences 
of its conduct, and that a sympathy with the British, 
if not with the American sufferers, would have arrested 
the cruel career opened by its example. 

“ This unhappily was not the case. In violation both 
of consistency and of humanity, American officers and 
non commissioned officers, in double the number of the 
British soldiers confined here, were ordered into close 
confinement with formal notice that in the event of a re¬ 
taliation for the death which might be inflicted on the 
prisoners of war sent to Great Britain for trial, the officers 
so confined would he put to death also. It was notified 
at the same time that the commanders of thq, British 
fleets and armies on our coasts are instructed, in the 
same event, to proceed with a destructive severity 
against our towns and their inhabitants. 

“ That no doubt might be left with the enemy of our 
adherence to the retaliatory resort imposed on us, a cor¬ 
respondent number of British officers, prisoners of war in 
our hands, were immediately put into close confinement 
to abide the fate of those confined by the enemy; and the 
British government has been apprized of the deter¬ 
mination of this government to retaliate any other pro¬ 
ceedings against us contrary to the legitimate modes of 
warfare. 

“ It is as fortunate for the United States that they havdt 
in their power to ifieet the enemy in this deplorable con¬ 
test, as it is honorable to them that they do not join in it 
but under the most imperious obligations, and with the 
humane purpose of effectuating a return to the establish¬ 
ed usages of war.” 

With these facts before the reader, let him 
examine Gen. Scott’s pretension of having been 
the man who put this retaliatory system into 
operation. Observe what a heroic demonstration 


/ 




















16 


# 


he makes of himself, in setting up his own 
championship on this great national question, 
in regard to which he would leave the reader to 
suppose, the President and government had been 
entirely remiss, if not afraid to take a stand. 

“ Among the prisoners taken by the British at Queens¬ 
town with Scott, were about sixty naturalized citizens, a 
large portion of whom were Irishmen. The British au¬ 
thorities claimed the right, and expressed the determina 
tion, to hang them as traitors. These men were at Quebec 
on board a vessel with Scott and the rest of the prisoners, 
all bound to Boston to be exchanged. The British of¬ 
ficers came on board and began to select the Irishmen, 
whom they intended to send home to grace the gallows. 
The officers had no sure means of detecting the Irish but 
by their brogue, or their confession. Scott, who was 
below, hearing what was going on, immediately rushed 
on deck, and told his afflicted men to hold their peace. 
Then, turning to the British officers, he boldly denounced 
their proceedings, and threatened a like retaliation upon 
British prisoners if they dared to execute a single man 
among his comrades. 

The officers haughtily reminded him that he was him¬ 
self a prisoner, and ordered him into the cabin. He was 
not a man to he intimidated, and refused to go, and again 
called upon his Irish soldiers to answer no more questions, j 
A high quarrel ensued; but the result was that no more j 
of the prisoners could be identified as Irishmen, for they 
would not open their lips. The officers, however, had 
already selected twenty three before Scott made his ap 
pearance. These were separated from their fellow 
prisoners and put on board a frigate, and dispatched to 
England to be hung. But they did not go until Scott bad 
solemnly warned the British authorities that he would 
surely avenge the death of every man they dared to lay 
violent hands upon, by a terrible retribution upon the first 
English prisoners that should fall into his hands after he 
should be liberated. 

Scott was soon exchanged. How faithfully he kept his 
promise we shall see. He proceeded at once to Washing 
ton, and obtained the passage, by Congress, of a law to 
retaliate upon British prisoners any such outrage as was 
threatened at Quebec. He again fought and conquered, j 
He had prisoners in plenty. He forthwith selected 
twenty-three of genuine English descent, (for he declared 
he would not offset Irish by Irish,) and held them as j 
hostages for the doomed twenty three Irishmen taken i 
home to be executed. He then communicated to the j 
British authorities what he had done, and informed them , 
that if they dared to execute their threat on the twenty- } 
three Irishmen, the twenty three Englishmen should pay j 
the penalty by promptly sharing the same fate. The con- j 
sequence was, that the livesof the Irishmen were spared, 
and at the close of the war they were embarked from | 
England, and shortly after arrived in New York.” 

What a tremendous threat (Scott himself being j 
a prisoner at Quebec,) when “ he solemnly 
warned the British authorities that he would 
surely avenge the death of every man they dared 
to lav hands upon, by a terrible retribution upon 
the first English prisoners that should fall into 
his hands, after he should be liberated !!” Is it 
not wonderful that they dared to liberate him? 
The President had sometime before, ordered two 
for one to be incarcerated as hostages for every 
adopted citizen whose life was.threatened, and the 
officers of our army and navy had duly executed 
the order. But what was the actual execution of 
the threat by such Lilliputians as Madison and 
Brown and Decatur, and the rest of our com¬ 
manders by the land and sea in comparison 
with the bare assertion of Captain Lemuel Gul¬ 
liver ,when he was a prisoner on board a British 
ship!”—That dread word spoken by the terrific 
Scott was more potent than the President’s, backed 
by the army and navy. “ The consequence was 
that the lives of the Irishmen were spared.” 


It is a pity to spoil this heroic drama so beau¬ 
tifully gotten up by General Scott’s fancy on the 
eve of the Presidential election to reconcile our 
adopted citizens to support him, after having 
boasted that he was the founder of the party 
whose object was to prevent them from being 
adopted citizens at all. But it must be done.— 
Mr. Madison’s message proves that what Scott 
pretends he started in 1813, was executed as na¬ 
tional law from the threshold of the war in 1812; 
and the statute of 1813 (of which Scott assumes 
the paternity) in relation to retaliation, proves 
that the very particulars which he gives to color 
his fabrication, must be false. The act was not 
passed to empower the President to do what he 
had already done, but to give the authority of 
Congress to a more stringent measure, that of re¬ 
taliating the death of any adopted citizen execu¬ 
ted for treason, as being taken in arms, by that 
of any British subject whether taken in arms or 
ntft, and wherever found. A bill had been intro¬ 
duced by Mr. Wright to authorize retaliation, 
but it had been laid aside as unnecessary, the 
President having the power and having exercised 
it. At the close of the session Mr. Campbell of 
Tennessee obtained the passage of a bill designa¬ 
ting the mode of retaliation, as well as authori¬ 
zing it and prescribing how it should be brought 
to bear upon the enemy—the sufferers to be se¬ 
lected as follows : It designates “t» the first in¬ 
stance, a prisoner who having been in the United 
States and having betn a citizen thereof, shall have 
been taken whilst voluntarily bearing arms in the 
service of Great Britain against the United States . ” 

The second class is composed of those “ native 
of some one of the British colonies, now the United 
Slates, as may not have been a citizen of the United 
States.” 

And 3d, on failure to find a sufficient number 
of either class among the prisoners taken from 
the enemy, the President might t( cause retaliation 
to be executed on any British subject wherever found, 
and whether taken in arms or not against the United 
States”—(See the fid in 3 dvol. of Giles’s Register, 
p. 358.) 

This record defeats therefore, the circumstanti- 
alities on which the General relied to give the ap¬ 
pearance of very exact truth to the story fabrica¬ 
ted, to propitiate the Irish and other adopted 
citizens to his support, notwithstanding his war¬ 
fare against them, he tells us in detail that after the 
law passed, “ he again fought and conquered—he 
had prisoners in plen ty—he forthwith selected twenty- 
three of genuine English descent (for he declared 
he would not offset Irish by Irish) and held them 
for the doomed twenty-three Irishmen “ taken home 
to be executed.” 

Now it appears from the very act of Congress 
which Scott pretends he had caused to be passed, 
that prisoners of genuine English descent could 
not be selected in the first or in the second instance. 
The law makes the selection of the first and 
second class, and the first might include Irishmen 
naturalized who had gone over to Canada and 
joined the British standard, if any such there 
were. The second class was specified for the 
purpose of making the tory refugees born in our 





















17 


. » 

country who had taken up arms against it, furnish j 
the next victims. And in the last place, the law j 
allowed any British subject wherever found and j 
whether taken in arms or not, to be put to death j 
in retaliation for the execution of any American j 
citizen, but did not allow Scott “ forthwith” to ! 
make the selection, or to make it at all, but the ! 
President of the United States—and unluckily for 
his long memory,. it appeal's that in the very ease 
of the twenty-three prisoners he cites for his own 
—the President did not depute him to act in the 
matter at all, but did depute General Dearborn, 
a fact shown by that careful collector of news 
during the war, Niles, who quotes in the 4th vol 
of his Register, page 238, the following passage 
from General Dearborn’s letter: “J have taken j 
Pleasures in relation to the twenty-three prisoners 
ivho are to be put in close confinement . ” 

Hence it appears that Scott’s attempt to take 
on himself the functions of the President, of 
Congress and of General Dearborn, with respect 
to the retaliatory measures, proves to be a failure 
from the beginning to the end. The whole 
drama must pass for a fiction, unless he can 
bring forward some of the spectators of that re¬ 
markable theatrical scene of which we have in j 
the autobiography such an interesting wood-cut i 
—the twenty-three Irish prisoners to a man, 
landing on the quay at New York, and embracing 1 
him. “Singularly enough it so happened”— 
this is the written account and is the conver¬ 
sational idiom of Scott himself. “ Singularly 
enough it so happened, that on the very day of 
the landing of these old comrades of General 
Scott on the wharf, their commander and friend 
then still’ suffering from his wounds, passed along 
the quay on foot. He was instantly recognized 
by the now liberated prisoners, and knowing all 
he had accomplished in their behalf, they rushed 
upon him with cheers, expressing a fervor of af¬ 
fection, gratitude and delight that jt is impossible 
to describe. Their joy was unbounded as the 
recognition became mutual. He was seized and 
shaken till the mingled pain of his wounds and 
the emotions produced by such a heartfelt ex¬ 
hibition caused even the tear of stalwart man¬ 
hood to course unbidden down his cheek.” How 
like a novel this reads ! and how marvelous are 
the many coincidences! There were upwards 
of six hundred prisoners carried to England, to 
answer to the charge of treason. The twenty- 
three of Scott’s drama stuck together in going 
over to England, hung together through all the 
changes'of their imprisonment in that country, 
and it “singularly so happened,” after the “close 
of the war,” when they were liberated, they all* 
got together on the same ship, reached New 
York at the very moment that General Scott 
was walking on the particular quay where they 
landed, and it singularly so happened too, that 
“ knowing all lie had accomplished in their 
behalftha,t is, that he had got the law passed 
to take twenty-three of the genuine English in 
their stead, had taken them prisoners, put them 
in confinement and so delivered them (the Irish¬ 
men)—dungs that never happened at New York, 
or ever happened at all. The twenty-three 
“rushed jpon him,” and he was seized and 


shaken until the pain of his wound &c., brought 
about the catastrophe of forcing “the tear of 
stalwart manhood to course unbidden down his 
cheek.” Now it must be remembered that this 
wound is itself a contradiction to this story, for 
the hero was not “ still suffering” from it after 
the close of the war. 

Now why is this scene between the Irishmen 
and General Scott so elaborately worked up and 
connected with such a narrative in regard to his 
establishing the retaliatory system, and acting 
with such zeal under it for the Irish, every word 
of which is shown to be false by the authentic 
history of the country? It has its origin in the 
same motive which produced the following dec¬ 
laration in General Scott’s letter of March last, 
to the Irish committee celebrating St. Patrick’s 
day. 

“Perhaps no man ” says Gen. Scott, e< certainly no 
American, owes sq much to the valor and blood of Irishmen 
as myself. Many of them marched and fought under my 
command in the war of 1812-’15; and many more — thou¬ 
sands in the recent war with Mexico, not one of whom, 
was ever known to turn his back upon the enemy or a 
friend .” % 

I am, Gentlemen, with very cordial respect, 

WINFIELD SCOTT.’, 


And yet this man hung a whole company of 
fifty Irishmen called St. Patrick’s legion, by 
platoons, for deserting his standard and fighting 
for the Mexicans “ in the recent war with Mexi¬ 
co!” No doubt these deluded men were justly 
condemned ; but there might be something in 
the motives of their desertion to extenuate their 
crime. They deserted to a standard to which 
they were invoked by their religious faith, and 
j they defended it in the field with a Courage which 
extorted praise even from their deeply provoked 
vanquishers. They fought after the Mexicans 
had fled, with the enthusiasm of the crusaders 
when the Cross was their only Banner. The 
conduct of these men made true one-half at least 
of what Scott says of them in his letter—they 
did not turn their backs on him as “ an enemy,” 
although the fate to which they were consigned 
proves that he must have condemned them for 
deserting him as a “friend. ” They suffered under 
Scott’s orders the highest penalty that the mar¬ 
tial law could inflict. Some four or five of them, 
and among them Riley, their leader, from the fact 
that they had deserted in time of peace, could 
not be brought under the death penalty. These 
were burned in each cheek with a hot iron and 
scourged to the last extremity with the cat. The 
rest, about fifty in number, were hung in pla¬ 
toons as already stated. No commutation of 
sentence was allowed, nor was the remarkable 
fact that Riley the ringleader and seducer of the 
rest, was necessarily permitted to go Scott free, 
having deserted before the war, suffered to ope¬ 
rate in favor of the dupes of this more intelligent and 
commanding spirit. This strange exception only 
distinguishes this execution from that sort of 
Spanish vengeance which delights in mass mas¬ 
sacre. But there is another striking particular 
which distinguishes this military execution ev 
masse, from any other in history. Necessity 
sometimes compels the execution of bodies of 
men whom it is difficult to retain as prisoners, 


t 














18 


9 


» 


and when their escape may be fatal; or the im¬ 
portance of a dreadful example, when the safety 
of an army may depend on the prevention of 
desertion, and when this can only be effected 
by the utmost severity. In the instance, where 
almost the whole legion of St Patrick (consist¬ 
ing of eighty men) were immolated, part on the 
field of Churubuseo, the rest on the gallows, no 
such reasons existed to justify the wholesale 
slaughter ; neither the safety nor the success of 
the army required it. As if to manifest this to 
the world, the prisoners were led to execution 
when our troops were marched to the storm of 
Chapultepec, and were told that when our flag 
would be unfurled on this last defence of Mexi¬ 
co, it would be their death signal. They were 
placed with ropes round their necks in full view 
of Chapultepec, and mate to witness the fall of 
the ensign to which they had devoted themselves 
in their Saint’s name. This was intended to ag¬ 
gravate the sufferings of their last moments, 
and to make them feel that their sacrifice was 
neither the effect of fear nor of necessity, but 
the indulgence of an appetite for revenge. And 
what a comment is this upon General Scott’s 
letter to the St. Patrick’s Society, celebrating 
Saint Patrick’s Day in Philadelphia! “No 
man,” he tells them, “owes so much to the 
valor and blood of Irishmen as myself : thou¬ 
sands marched and fought under my command 
in the recent war with Mexico, not one of whom 
was ever known to turn his back upon the 
enemy or a friend 1!” And yet, when that flag 
of ours which owed so much to “ the valor and 
blood of Irishmen,” floated in triumph upon the 
height of Chapultepec, the “ legion of St. Pat¬ 
rick,” was displayed on the neighboring height 
hanging on a gallows!! Was it necessary to 
contrast thus the glory of the United States and 
the shame of ill-fated Ireland? Was it not j 
enough that these men died for their offence ? | 
Was it necessary to make them feel that Ireland j 
was to be humbled, if not disgraced in this day 
of glory to our countrymen ? Do we not see in 
this event more of the spirit which signalizes 
Gen. Scott’s letter to Mr. Harper, boasting of 
his being the founder of a society to exclude 
Irishmen from American citizenship, than of his 
holiday letter to St. Patrick’s Society? Who 
does not perceive the selfishness and heartless¬ 
ness which dictated both letters? The Mexican 
gallows in sight of Chapultepec proclaimed 
Scott’s real feelings towards Irishmen—the old 
federal feeling which dictated the alien law, 
giving the elder President Adams the power to 
send out of the country, the seditious and re¬ 
bellious Irish democrats (as they were called) 
who threatened the overthrow of the federal 
party. Scott’s native American party and his 
appeal, under the signature of Americus, origi¬ 
nated in the same party views that produced the 
alien law of 1798; and the late zeal of the 
federal leader, which, it is pretended outstripped 
that of Mr. Madison and the Democrats of his 
day in favor of our adopted cif.zens, and which 
is now so earnest with the society of St. Pat¬ 
rick, is but the consequence of the failure of the 
natives as a party of iniluence. 


Scott’s quarrel with Gens. Gaines and 

Macomb; contumacy to the Adams Ad- 

/ 

ministration, and ingratitude to Mr. Clay. 

The death of General Brown making the place 
of Commander-in-chief vacant, produced a ve¬ 
hement controversy between Scott and Gaines 
for the appointment. Each insisted on it as a 
matter of right and the feud grew to such mad¬ 
ness, that to prevent the belligerents appealing 
to a trial by duel, Gen. Macomb was appointed 
over them. When Macomb was selected in the 
hope of allaying the strife between the vindictive 
rivals, the 1 resident found he had only transfer¬ 
red Scott’s wrath to himself. He denied the 
power of the President and Senate to give Ma¬ 
comb a commission which would authorize him 
to take command of the Army, insisting that his 
Senior brevet Major Generalship excluded any 
one elsefrom the chief command. Scott refused 
to obey Macomb, and in the end the Secretary 
of War, General Por'er, addressed him this let¬ 
ter : 

“ Department of War, 

November 26, 1828. 

“ Sir :—It is not the purpose of the President to take 
any final order in relation to your late very reprehensible 
conduct, until a sufficient time shall have elapsed for the 
receipt of your deliberate answer to the letter addressed to 
you from this Department on the 15th inst , and which 
contains an exposition of the Views of the President on 
the several questions you have raised. The nature of that 
order will, as you perceive, depend in a great measure on 
the character of the answer received from you, and which 
the President hopes may not be wholly unifluenced by the 
considerations which, by his directions, have been pre¬ 
sented to you. 

“ To put a stop, in the meantime, to the course of in¬ 
subordination in which you have deemed fit to indulge, 
the President directs that from the receipt of this letter 
you will consider yourself suspended from the command 
of the Western department of the \riny, until his further 
pleasure shall be made known to you. 

I have the honor to be your obedient servant, 

P. B. PORTER. 

Brevet Major Gen‘l Scott, U. S. A., 

Cincinnati. 

Throughout the controversy with Gaines, Mr. 
Clay who was premier in the Cabinet, stood 
staunchly by Scott,and it was generally understood 
that he favored the lenient course to which the 
latter owed the retention of his place and obtained 
what Scott in reply to the above letter from Por¬ 
ter says “ sounds like a reprieve.” There is hard¬ 
ly a doubt but that for Clay’s interposition, Scott 
would have been cashiered for disobedience of 
orders. 

Two marked incidents in Scott’s conduct sub¬ 
sequently tend to develop his character,. General 
Jackson was ^elected whilst Scott waVstill under 
suspension, asserting as he contended his own 
rights and the rights of his brother officers.— 
Against Jackson, if against any body, he ought 
to have maintained his position, apd proved that 
his disobedience was not mutiny. But his first 
act was to make his submission to the man whom 
he had charged w th mutiny, and in the very act 
confessed, that while he had held out in contempt¬ 
uous disobedience to indulgent friends under the 
pretence of principle, he was ready to succumb 
and sacrifice it rather than assert it againsfthe au¬ 
thority of the bold man who,he knew “w^tild sub¬ 
mit to nothing that was wrong.” 

o o 

./ 

/ 

/ 



















19 


Another' trait of General »Scott’s character is 
evinced in his treatment of his friend Clay who 
stood by him in his troubles. Every one knows 
that the favorable crisis in Mr. Clay’s career and 
which seemed likely to decide in his behalf, the 
appeal to his country against what he called the 
calumnies of his political opponents, occurred in 
1840. If the Whig Convention had nominated 
Clay instead of Harrison, there is no doubt he 
would have been elected President. Scott held 
the balance of power in that Convention and his 
friends gave the nomination to Harrison—cer¬ 
tainly not on the score of superior fitness, but to 
keep up the military prestige. Clay felt this 
“ the unkindest cut of all, ” and shortly afterwards 
in an impulsive moment, upbraided Scott to his 
face, for his foul play, and provoked a state of 
things which it cost the utmost difficulty among 
their friends to settle without bloodshed. Scott’s 
ingratitude was the arrow that stuck in Clay’s 
side at his death. 

-- hceret lateri lethalis arundo. 

Scott and his War with the City Councils 
of New York. 

No sooner had Scott got through his exhibi¬ 
tion of himself, after the war in Europe as well 
as in the United States, than he broached a quar¬ 
rel with the people and councils of the City of 
New York where he was stationed. The city 
had given to the Government of the United 
States, the battery and its beautiful promenade 
as a position for a castle of defence for the city’s 
protection. Scott, inflated with self-importance 
resolved to appropriate it as his Head Quarters 
and build a residence and offices, so that he 
might himself, occupy the whole of that breath¬ 
ing place of the city, for his own accommoda¬ 
tion He thought it polite to inform the city 
councils of his purpose and to ask their assent. 
The proposal was received with surprise, but at 
once, firmly though courteously denied. Scott 
without considering their consent of any impor¬ 
tance, after it was refused, had materials hauled, 
began the work by digging foundations, and 
erecting preparatory buildings, when he was ob¬ 
structed not only by the opposit on of the city, 
but by menaces of the people. Scott brought 
some of his soldiers over from Governor’s Island 
to protect his works, which no doubt from the 
temper he manifested, would have been construct¬ 
ed upon the plan of those in cities under military 
government, to control the people within, rather 
than a' force without. But the people of this 
country are not of the race to submit to any 
tiling wearing the appearance of military rule, 
and especially where it shewsUtself in abridging 
the liberty and comfort of a great population, for 
the convenience of one man. The city was 
roused to resistance and Scott was compelled by 
the President to desist. 

General Scott’s conduct towards Presi¬ 
dent Polk and Secretary Marcy. 

It was natural and proper, that being exclu¬ 
sively a military man, and at the head of the j 


army, General Scott should seek, on the opening 
of the war with Mexico, to take the field and 
gather fresh laurels to replace those that had 
faded during the Florida campaign. He shewed 
the greatest alacrity for the service, as the cor¬ 
respondence with Secretary Marcy proves. He 
had a presidential game to play against the man 
who was to trust him. As a candidate for the 
Whig nomination to the Presidency, from the day 
when he gave way to Harrison, in 1840, he looked 
to that interest as permanent. To restore his 
tarnished repute, and acquire a new recommen¬ 
dation to.enforce his claims for his party’s sup¬ 
port to the presidential honor, were strong incen¬ 
tives to his eager ambition in laying hold of the 
chief command in Mexico. It was conceded to 
him by President Polk, and the Secretary of 
War (Mr. Marcy) zealously pressed his prepa¬ 
rations. Considering that they were political 
opponents—that by committing the war, they com¬ 
mitted the fate of the administration, to his hands 
and gave him at the same time the opportunity 
to outstrip all his Whig rivals, in opening to him 
the way to victory and supplying the means to 
reach it, he ought to have been grateful. But 
what was his first move after he supposed that 
all was committed to him ? that all their plans 
depended upon him, and that his refusal to lend 
his military skill and reputation to them would 
frustrate everything. He determined to bring 
the administration to an absolute submission to 
his will—to take his own time, forward on every¬ 
thing before him to Mexico—to trust nothing to 
the administration, nor allow it to share in any 
of the duties or glories of the war with Mexico. 
Although at first professing great readiness to 
go and assume the functions of General in the 
field, he resolved after being installed, to stay and 
play Napoleon, by sending the army in advance, 
and all that the country could command for his 
services, before he would make his appearance 
on the scene of operations. Filled with these 
self-important designs he wrote the letter which 
ai^azed the country so much, and from which 
we extract the pointed paragiaphs. He replied 
to Mr. Marcy, when urged by him and the Presi¬ 
dent to put himself at the head of that army 
which Taylor was then leading to successive 
victories, as follows : 


Sir : 


Head-Quarters of the Army, 
Washington, May 21, 1846. 


********** 

In the midst of these multitudinous and indi-pensable 
occupations, l have learned Horn you that much impa¬ 
tience is already felt, perhaps in high quarters, that f have 
not already pur myself in route for the Rio Grande; and 
now, with lourteen hours a day of pn-limin iry work re¬ 
maining on my hands for many days, 1 find mysi If com- 
p« lied to stop that necessary work, to auard myself 
against, perhaps, utter condemnation in the quarters al- 
1 tided to. I am to » old a soldier, and have had too much 
special experience, not to feel the infinite importance of 
securiug myself against danger, ill wdl, (or precondetnna- 
tion,) in my rear, before advancing upon the public 
eneinv. Not an advantageous step can he taken in a 
forward march without the confidence that all is well 
behind. If insecure In that quarter, no general can put 
his whole heart and mind into the work to he done in 
front. I am, therefore, not a little alarmed, nay,crippled 


















20 


in my energies, by the knowledge of the impatience in 
question, and J beg to say I tear no other danger. 

My intentions have been, after making all preliminary 
arrangements here, to pass down the Ohio and Mississippi 
to see, or to assure myself by correspondence, that the 
volunteers on whom we are mostly to ? ely in the prosecu 
lion of the existing war, are rapidly assembling for the 
service ; to learn the probable time of their readiness to 
advance upon Mexico; to ascertain if their supplies of 
every kind are in place, or are likely to be in place in 
sufficient time ; to hasten one and the other; to harmonize 
the movements of volunteers, and to modify their routes, 
(if necessary,) so that all, or at least a sufficient number, 
shall arrive at the indicated points in the Mexican fron¬ 
tier, at the best periods, and as far as practicable, about 
the same time. All that T have but sketched, I deem to 
be not only useful to success, but. indispensable. As a 
soldier T make this assertion without the fear of contra¬ 
diction from any honest and candid soldier. 

Against the ad caplandum condemnation of all per¬ 
sons, whoever may be designated for the high command in 
question, there can be no reliance (in his absence) other 
than the active, candid, and steady support of the govern 
ment. If I cannot have that sure basis to rest upon, it 
will be infinitely better for the country (not to speak of 
my personal security) that some other commander of the 
new army against Mexico should be selected. No matter 
who he may he, he shall, at least, he judged and sup¬ 
ported by me, in this office, and everywhere else, as I 
would desire, if personally in that command, to be myself 
judged and supported. My explicit meaning is, that I do 
not desire to place myself in the most perilous of all po¬ 
sitions —afire upon my rear from Washington, and a tire 
in front from the Mexicans. ****** 
It was to command such larger army that I understood 
myself as likely to be sent to the Mexican frontier. As it 
is always unjust to a junior general who has done well, 
and is supposed to be doing well, to supersede him by a gen¬ 
eral of higher rank without sending with the latter corres¬ 
ponding reinforcements, I should esteem myself the un¬ 
happy instrument of wounding the honorable pride of the 
gallant and judicious Taylor, if ordered to supersede him 
under different circumstances. 

However the foregoing suggestions (hastily thrown to 
gether) may be viewed, i have deemed it due more to the 
country than my humble self that I should present them, 
and await the wishes or the orders of tiie President. 

With greatest respect, I have the honor to remain, sir, 
your most obedient servant, 

WINFIELD SCOTT, 

Hon. W. L. Marcy, 

Secretary of War. 

If there was ever a more dictatorial, insolent and 
insulting letter than this, written to a chief 
magistrate by an officer put in command of an 
army by his favor, history has not preserved it. 
The obvious import is, “Sir, I do not mean to 
trust you. You know I am a candidate for the 
high post which you hold and to which you wish 
to be re-elected, and you will be willing to sacri¬ 
fice the country, to sacrifice me, and as soon as 
l turn my back you wiJ 1 make war on me whilst 
I make war on Mexico. I'shall be between two 
fires, one in front and one in rear. You will 
withhold supplies that I may fail in my functions, 
and that you may profit by my fall. Therefore 
I will stay, take it on myself to see that the War 
Department forwards force and supplies sufficient 
to render me independent of your authority, and 
then I will go and play the part of master abroad 
as I must at home before leaving ” 

There is no man of penetration who will not at 
a glance perceive the imperious spirit illy dis¬ 
guised in the presumptuous mystification of this 
letter. The Secretary of War answered with 
his habitual cool, good sense— 

War Department, May 25, 1846. 

Sir : I have received your letter of the 21st iust., and 


-— - • --tz_ 


[considering its extraordinary character, and the grave 
i matters set forth therein, reflecting upon the motives and 
! objects of the President in tendering to you, as he has in 
i an explicit manner, the command of the forces destined 
I for the war against Mexico, I deemed it to be my duty 
to lay it before him, and to take his direction in regard to 
j its contents. 

The passages in your letter which have excited his sur- 
' prise and deep regret are those in which you impute to 
i the President, in terms not inexplicit ill will towards 
yourself, or precondemnation, and a course of conduct on 
I his part, which has already, as you allege, impeded your 
I labors of preparation and crippled your energies, 
i A reference to two or three paragraphs in your letter, 
will show that he is not at liberty to give a different con¬ 
struction to your language. You were, through me, and 
also at a personal interview with the President, made ae- 
quainted with his settled determination to putyouin imme¬ 
diate command of the forces to be employed in carrying 
on the war with Mexico, and you had, as you state, been 
devoting your time and attention to preliminary aud 
preparatory arrangements. “ In the midst of these multi¬ 
tudinous and indispensable occupations,” you say, “ I have 
learned from you that much impatience is already felt, 
perhaps in high quarters, that l have not already putmy- 
J self in route for the Rio Grande; and now, with fourteen 
hours a day of preliminary work remaining on my hands 
for many days, I find myself compelled to stop that ne¬ 
cessary work, to guard myself against, perhaps, uttercon- 
demnation in the quarters alluded to. I am too old a 
soldier, and have had too much special experience, n-ot 
to feel the infinite importance of securing myself against 
danger, (ill will, or precondemation,) in my rear, be 
fore advancing upon the public enemy. Not an advan¬ 
tageous step can be taken in a forward march, without 
the confidence that all is well behind. If insecure in that 
quarter, no general can put his whole heart and mind into 
the work to be done in front. I am, therefore, not a 
little alarmed, nay, crippled in my energies, by the 
knowledge of the impatience in question, and I beg to 
say 1 fear no otner danger.” 

This language scarcely requires a comment. That it 
conveys the strongest suspicion, not to say a direct impu¬ 
tation of most unworthy motives in the Executive Govern¬ 
ment—of bad faith towards yourself—of a reckless disre¬ 
gard of the interests of the country—of a design to carry 
on a war against you when you were sent forth to carry 
on a war against the public enemy, there can he, I think, 
no question. You must allow me to advert to the only 
fact to which you allude as the foundation for such grave 
imputations. You have learned, you say, from me, that 
much impatience is felt, perhaps in high quarters, that 
you are not already put in route for the Rio Grande, &e. 

What was said on this point at our interview, when 
this subject was alluded to, is not so fully stated as it ought 
to be, considering the purposes to which you have con- 
■ verted it. ***** * 

! I did not deem it improper, indeed, considered it a 
matter of duty to communicate to the general, to whom 
the President had freely confided the management of the 
war, his views and expectations upon this point. That 
this communication, made in the manner it was, should 
not have been kindly received, is surprising to me, hut 
vastly more so is the fact that it should he made the basis 
of the most offensive imputations against the Executive 
government which had voluntarily selected you to con¬ 
duct our army, and determined to put at your disposal 
the amplest means it could command to ensure victory, 
and to bring the war to a successful and speedy termina¬ 
tion. It was also a matter of unfeigned surprise tome, 
that you should have attributed to the President the in¬ 
tention of opening a fire upon your rear, while a fire in 
j front was opened upon you by the enemy. On what 
foundation could such an assumption rest? Hadnottiie 
President, in a frank and friendly spirit, just intrusted 
you with a command on which the glory and interest of 
the country depended, to say nothing of the success of 
his own administration? How could you under these 
circumstances, arrest your labors of preparation, and 
; suffer your energies to be crippled, for the purpose of 
indulging in illiberal imputations against the man who had 
just bestowed upon you the highest marksofhisemifidencc. 

Entertaining, as it i-= most evident you do, the opinion 
that such are the motives and designs of the Executive 
towards you, and declaring it to be your explicit mean¬ 
ing that “ you douiot desire to place yourself in the most 
















21 


perilous of all positions”—“a fire upon your rear from 
Washington, and the fire in front from the Mexicans,” 
and so entertaining them without cause, or even the 
shadow of justification, the President would be wanting 
in his duty to the country, if he were to presist in his de 
termination of impos g upon you the command of the 
army in the war against Mexico. He would probably 
misunderstand the object you had in view in writing the 
letter, and disappoint your expectations, if he did not be¬ 
lieve that it was intended to effect a change of bis pur¬ 
pose in this respect. I am, therefore, directed by him to 
say that you will be continued in your present position 
here, and will devote your efforts to making arrange¬ 
ments and preparations for the early and vigorous pros¬ 
ecution of hostilities against Mexico. 

I have the honor to be, very respcctfullv, your obedient 
servant, < W.'L. MARCY. * 

Maj. Gen. Scott, 

Co mm anding General . ” 

General Scott found that he had miscalculated 
his own importance and the humihty of the ad¬ 
ministration. He consented to take on himself the 
submissive part, and denied his own meaning to 
flatter one whom he meant to intimidate. 

General Scott to the Secretary of War. 

Head-Q,uarters of the Army, 
Washington , May 25, 1846. 

Sir : Your letterof this date, received at about 6 p. m , 
as I sat down to take a hasty plate of soup, demands a 
prompt reply. 

You have taken four days to reflect and to convict me 
upon my letter to you of the 21st instant, of official, 
perhaps personal disrespect to the constitutional com¬ 
mander-in chief of the Army and Navy of the United 
States. 

If you have succeeded in imparting that impression to 
the President, then by the conclusion of your letter, written 
in his behalf, 1 am placed under very high obligations to 
his magnanimity—may I not add, to his kindness 1 —in not 
placing me instantly in arrest, and before a general court 
martial. I may then hope that the President saw no such 
intended disrespect; and 1 can assure you both that 1 feel 
too great a deference to the laws and constitution of my 
country to offer or to design an indignity to our Chief 
Magistrate. 

The strongest passages in my condemned letter are, I 
think, hypothetical. In it I spoke of “ impatience ”—per¬ 
haps in “high quarters;” of, “ perhaps, utter condemna¬ 
tion in the quarters alluded to;” of the infinite import¬ 
ance of securing myself against danger (ill will or pre¬ 
condemnation) in my rear;” and that “most perilous of 
all positions,” to any commander—“a fire upon [his] 
rear from Washington and the fire in front from the 
Mexicans.” And I also spoke of the necessity of the ac¬ 
tive, candid and steady support of [such commander’s] 
Government, in the hope of conciliating it. 

Now if there be any offence to the President in these 
passages—the intention of committing which I utterly 
disclaim—it must, in candor, be found in the meaning of 
the passages “ high quarters,” and “ the quarters alluded 
to,” which qualify all the others quoted by you. 

It will be perceived that I spoke not of the highest quar¬ 
ter, but in the plural, “high quarters,” and 1 beg, as an 
act of justice, no less to myself than the President, to say, 

I meant “ impatience” and even “ pre condemnation” 
on your part,and the known open anviolentcondemnation ! 
of me on the part of several leading friends and supposed j 
confidants of the President in the two Houses of Congress : 
(high quarters;) because, on an intimation—not an order ! 
—1 did not fly to the Rio Grande, without waiting for the | 
invading army yet to be raised—nay, abandoning it to get i 
to that nver as it could, and without the least regard to j 
the honorable pride and distinction of the gallant general j 
already in command on that river; who we knew had 
done well, was doing well, and who, I was quite sure, ! 
and his little army, would, if the occasion offered, cover t 
themselves with glory. My prediction in this respect has 
been fully accomplished. 

* * * ******** J 

Whether it shall be the pleasure of the President to 1 
send me to the Rio Grande (which I should prefer) or to j 
retain me here, 1 can only say, 1 am equally ready to do i 


J my duty in either position, with all my zeal and all my 
I ability. 

In great haste, I have the honor to remain, &c., 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 
Hon. W. L. Maroy, Secretary of War. 

The Secretary of War to Gen. Scott. 

War Department, 

June 2, 1846. 

Sir:—W hen I received your letter of the 27th ultime, 
it was my indention to answer it at some length, and t® 

! note the misapprehensions under which you are still la- 
j boring, but on account of my official engagements at this 
j particular juncture, and not wishing to protract this cor- 
j respondenee, which can end in no practical good, I have 
| changed my purpose, preferring to point out those mis¬ 
apprehensions in a personal interview, if you should de¬ 
sire it. 

Your communications have all been laid before the 
President, but I have received no instructions to change 
or modify the directions contained in the closing para¬ 
graph of my letter of the 25lh ultimo. , 

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

W. L. MARCY. 

Major General W. Scott. 

So Scott swallowed with his “ hasty plate of 
soup” all his insolent insinuations, and still a 
! disappointment followed. He denies altogether 
! Mr. Marcy’s interpretation of his letter, and says 
(if the President entertains it,) “I am placed under 
very high obligations to his magnanimity, may I not 
add kindness ? in not placing me instantly in arrest 
and before a court martial. I may then hope that 
the President saw no such intended disrespect, and I 
can assure you both, that I feel too great deference to 
the Constitution ynd laics of the country to offer or 
design an indignity to our Chief Magistrate.” 

“ The strongest passages in my condemned letter are, I 
think, hypothetical. In it I spoke of impatience, perhaps, 
m high quarters—of perhaps utter condemnation in the 
quarters alluded to—of the infinite importance o f securing 
n»ysclf against danger (ill will or precondemnation) in my 
rear, and of that “ most perilous of all positions ,” to any 
commander, “a fire in his rear from Washington and the 
fire in front from the Mexicans .” JJnd I also spoke o f the 
necessity of the active, candid and steady support of such 
commander’s government in the hope of conciliating it.” 

After denying that in this he intended any of¬ 
fence to the President, he puts in this special 
plea to prove it. He says : 

“It will be perceived that I spoke not of the highest quarter, 
but in the plural, high quarters ; and, I beg , as an act of jus¬ 
tice no less to myself than to the President to say, I meant 
impatience and eSren precondemnation onyourpart and the 
known open and violent denunciation of me on the part of 
several leading friends and supposed confidants of the 
President in the two Houses o f Congress ”—( high quar 
ters ;) because on an intimation—not an order — I did not 
fly to the Rio Grande, without waiting for the invading 
army, yet to hi raised — nay, abandoning it to get 
to that river as it could, and withovt the least regard 
to the honorable pride and distinction of the gallant Gene¬ 
ral already in command on that river ; who, we knew had 
done well, teas doing well , and who, I was quite sure, and 
his little 'army would, if the occasion offered, cover them¬ 
selves with glory. My prediction in this respect has been 
fully accomplished .” 

After this special pleading, this version of his 
attack upon the President and Secretary, he tries 
to make all go smooth by pouring out this unction 
in conclusion: “ You speak of my interview with 
the President on the subject of the intended formi¬ 
dable invasion of Mexico. I wish I had time to do 
justice to rny recollection of the President’s excellent 
sense, military comprehension, patience and courte¬ 
sies in these interviews. I have since spoke of the ad- 















22 




mirable qualities he displayed on these occasions, with 
honor as far as it was in my power to do him honor.” 
And then he turns to Mr. Marcy: “ Jlnd to you, 
sir, allow me to say that I have not accused you, and 
that I do not mean to accuse you, of a set purpose to 
discredit me as the commander at first designed for 
the new army that is to invade Mexico 1 bear in 
mind with pleasure, the many personal courtesies 
that I have for long years leceived at your hands. 
But I hare for many days believed that you have al¬ 
lowed yourself to be influenced against me by the 
clamor of some of the friends to whom I have al¬ 
luded.” 

All this after thought putting his insinuations 
against the Government, to the account of “several 
leading friends and supposed confidants of the Presi¬ 
dent in both houses of Congress,” is contradicted 
not only by the whole scope of the first letter, 
but by its words. He says, expressly after al¬ 
luding “to the condemnation of all other persons,” 
that the person in command can have “ no other 
reliance (in his absence) than the active, candid and 
steady support of his Government.” And it was 
simply because he had no confidence in the sup¬ 
port of his Government that he refused to go to 
Mexico, until lie had sent all the troops and sup¬ 
plies he wanted before him to Mexico. It is 
apparent then that it was not the condemnation 
of “ leading friends and supposed confidants ” 
that he cared for. It was because lie would 
have no reliance on the support of Government, 
the Departments, the high quarters, where the 
power resided to support him, that he felt him¬ 
self at liberty to say: “ Iam too old a soldier and 
have too much special experience not to feel the in- 
finite importance of securing myself against danger, 
(ill will or pre-condemnation,) in my rear, before 
advancing upon the public enemy.” With this 
explicit declaration to the Secretary, that he 
meant to secure himself and not trust the admin¬ 
istration, how poor is the comcqjf, that he alluded 
to “ friends and confidants.” but did not mean 
to insinuate that it was from such high quarters 
as head quarters itself, that lie expected “ the 
lire in his rear from Washington;” and yet with 
its support he feared nothing ! 

Mr. Marcy answered this letter of adulation as 
cooiy as the other, and in effect says, without 
saying it, “ I admit what the gentleman says, out 
«f compliment; however, I do not believe him.” 

Gen. Scott has another elaborate reply to this 
note of Mr. Marcy, in which is this begging 
passage: 

“ I *till liope when the President shall have read that 
explanatory letter (the ‘ hasty plate of soup’ letter) and 
the foregoing exposition of facts, attentively, he may he 
willing to recur to his original purpose and award to my 
senior rank the preference I have never ceased to enter 
tain, and vvhi.-h I would have pressed with incessant 
zeal, but lor t.ie apprehensions heretofore expressed, and 
which your letter lias nearly, if not quite, removed. 1 
therefore heg to claim that command whenever the Presi¬ 
dent may deem it proper to give me the assignment, 
whether to-day or at any other better time he may be 
pleased to de-ignat .” 

To this, Mr. Marcy answered briefly: 

“ Your communications have all been laid before the 
President, hut i have received no instructions to change 
or modify the directions contained in the closing para¬ 
graph of my letter of the 25th ult.” 


General Taylor’s movement on Monterey ren- « 
dered General Scott distressingly restive, and he 
addressed the Secretary of War in a plaintive 
missive, shewing that he no longer insisted on 
having his own time or his own way, and that he 
j had been some three months in that obedient 
! mood. 

j On the 12th of September, 1846, he reminds 
I the Secretary that on the 27th of May last, he 
had requested that he might be sent to take the 
immediate command of the principal army against 
Mexico, “either to day or at any better time the 
President may choose to designate.” And he 
adds, £ Should the President yield to my wishes, 
a few hours in New York and Philadelphia will 
enable me to make certain arrangements and save 
the necessity of a return to those cities from Wash- 
j ington. 1 suppose it would be easy for me to reach 
j the Rio Grande by the end of the month. ” To this 
j eager solicitation the Secretary replies, that the 
President “requests, me to inform you that it is 
not within the arrangements for conducting the 
; campaign, to supersede General Taylor in his 
Ij present command by assigning you to it.” 

On the ]8th of November, the President sup- 
! posing General Scott really contrite, gave him the 
I order “to repair to Mexico to take the command of 
; the forces there assembled and particularly to organ¬ 
ize and set on fool an expedition on the Gulf Coast.” 

Scott’s Manoeuvres against Gen. Taylor. 

After getting the plenary authority over the 
forces in Mexico, General Scott, knowing that 
General Taylor had taken Monterey and had ad- 
! vanced to Saltillo while Santa Anna was gather¬ 
ing his army at San Luis, perceived at once that 
| the position occupied by each of the belligerents 
presented a strong temptation to bring on a strug- 
i g!e between them at one point or the other.— 

If Taylor could defeat Santa Anna and take San 
Luis, the way to the city of Mexico would be 
: opened to him. If Santa Anna could vanquish 
Taylor at Saltillo, it would put his line on the 
Rio Grande in his power. Scot^ foresaw that 
the weakening of Taylor’s forceat Saltillo must 
bring down upon that point the army which had 
j been drawn together to oppose him, and which 
before Wool joined him, had already threatened 
him with an attack. To let Taylor remain in 
i strength to receive and defeat his antagonist, and 
to pursue his victory, Scott saw was to give his 
| rival, Taylor, the power to entei the city of Mex- 
| ico, and put an end to the war. This had been 
the route on which it was at first contemplated to 
march to the conquest of the city of Mexico.— 

| The difficulty of crossing the desert, and after 
being worn out by the march, to defeat Santa 
I Anna with a superior army, alone restrained 
Taylor from pursuing that plan which, he wrote 
to the Secretary, he only wanted adequate means 
to execute. This was the posture of things 
| when Scott arrived at the Rio Grande, 
i General Taylor had been consulted several 
j times by the Secretary of War, about the Gulf 
expedition ; at first, as if it would be committed 
to, him; and it was inquired, what force could 
be spared from that which he carried up the 
Rio Grande for that purpose, while maintaining 


















23 




a proper attitude in the country conquered by 
him. In a letter of Oct. 15th, 1846, from Mon¬ 
terey, he gives this account of his strength : “ I 
am satisfied, 500 men per regiment icould be a large 
average of effectives among the volunteers. This 
would give, including the cavalry, a force little short 
of 9,000 men, or adding 4,000 regulars, (our pres¬ 
ent strength is not 3,000,) a total force of 13,000. 
Leaving the very moderate number of 3,000 to se¬ 
cure our rear, I could, not he able to march from 
Saltillo with present, and expected means at the head 
of more than 10,000 men.” 

This was Taylor’s army, and the question 
was, how much of this force could be safely 
taken to act on the Gulf, (say Tampico or Vera 
Cruz,) giving up the plan of moving upon the 
city of Mexico by San Luis. On this point, 
General Taylor says . “ In the latter case the 
general line of the Siena Madre might very well 
be taken, but erhi then with the enemy in force on 
my front, it might be imprudent to detach to Tampi¬ 
co (this was the point of embarkation for Vera Cruz) 
so large a force as 3,000 or 4000, particularly of 
the description required for that operation.” 

Again recurring to the projected expedition to 
Vera Cruz, on the 12th of November, while he 
supposed he was himself to command, (Scott 
was not appointed until-the 18th of November, 
and Taylor did not know it until late in Decem¬ 
ber,) he says: <i A force of 10,000 men cannot 
be spared from the occupation of the line of the Si¬ 
erra Madre. Four thousand may be directed to 
that object [Vera Cruz ] and if to these, six thousand 
fresh troops from the United States were added at 
the proper lime, the expedition might be undertaken 
with a promise of success.” 

.Here the matter was simply and plainly laid 
down to the government by a General who had 
never failed in a promise or an undertaking.— 
With Santa Anna looking from San Luis, with 
eager eye on the line of the Sierra Madre, to 
break it at some weak point and destroy the 
communication on the Rio Grande—the conse¬ 
quence being the loss of all that had been gained 
—Taylor would not, to crown himself with lau¬ 
rels in the city of Mexico, detach more than 
4,000 men from that line. But what does Scott 
do on superseding Taylor? He runs up to Ca- 
margo, and in the absence of Taylor, who, 
without being apprised of Scott’s coming, had 
marched to Victoria with “ a desire” (as he tells 
Scott) to place in position for embarkation to Vera 
Cruz, should the government order an expedition to 
that point, the force (2,000 regulars, and 2,000 
volunteers) which I reported might be sp ired for 
that service.” Instead of being satisfied with the 
number which Taylor thought sufficient for him- ! 
self, with the troops coming from the United 
States, Scott seized the occasion, without con¬ 
sulting Taylor, and without regarding his state¬ 
ments to the Secretary of War, to strip him of 
almost his whole army. Here is Scott’s re¬ 
quisition made through General Butler, who 
commanded at Monterey, Taylor being at Vic¬ 
toria, to communicate in that direction with the 
Gulf. 

Scott says to Butler : (January 3, 1847:) 


| 

I “ You will, therefore, without, waiting to hear from 
General Taylor, and without the least unnecessary delay, 
in. order that they may he in time as above put in move 
mentfor the mouth of the Rio Grande, the following troops 
: —about 50(1 regular cavalry of I st and 2c/ regiments of dra¬ 
goons,including Lt. Col. Kearney’s trooji — about 500 volun¬ 
teer cavalry. I rely on you to select the best—tiro field bat¬ 
teries ofregidar light artillery, say Duncan’s and Taylor’s, 
and 4,000 regulars on foot, including artillery acting as in¬ 
fantry—the whole under Brevet Biigadier Gen’l Worth, 
j about this time, no dovbt, a Major General by brevet, and 
\ assigned to duty according to the latter rank. 

In addition, put, in movement for the same point, of em¬ 
barkation, [the Brazos] and to be there as above 4,000 vol¬ 
unteer infantry. ” 

When Taylor was informed of Scott’s move¬ 
ment, he returned to Monterey, and although 
little addicted to complaining, he addressed him 
| this*letter. 

Head Quarters^ Army of Occupation, 
Camp near Montcry, [ Victoria,] 

Jan. 15, 1847. 

i Str: —In a communication addressed this day to your 
Staff officer, I have replied to so much of j our letter, of 
the 6th inst., and its enclosures, as relates to points of 
j detail; but there are other and grave topics embraced in 
those communications, to which I deem it my right and 
my duty to repl^ directly. 

I The amount of force to be withdrawn from this frontier 
j and the manner in which it is proposed to withdraw it, 
had never fully come to my knowledge until yesterday, 

I though hinted at in your note of November 25th. Had 
J you, general, relieved me at once in the whole command, 

I and assigned me to duty under your orders, or allowed 
! me to retire from the field, be assured that no complaint 
would have been heard from me. But whilst almost 
j every man of my regular force, and half the volunteer# 

! (now in respectable discipline,) are withdrawn for distant 
j service, it seems that I am expected, witli less than a 
thousand regulars and a volunteer force, partly of new 
levies, to hold a defensive line, while a large army of more 
than 20,000 is in my front. 

I speak only of a defensive line, for the idea of assum¬ 
ing offensive operations in the direction of San Luis, by 
j March or even May, with such troops as can then be at 
my disposition, is quite too preposterous to be entertained 
j for a moment. After all that I have written to the De- 
| partmenton the subject of such operations, 1 find it dilTt- 
I cult to believe, that 1 am seriously expected to undertake 
them, with the extraordinary limited means placed at my 
disposal. 

I cannot misunderstand the object of the arrangements 
indicated in your letters. I feel that I have lost the con¬ 
fidence of the Government, or it would not have suffered 
| me to remain up to this time ignorant of its intentions, 
when so vitally affecting interests committed to my charge. 
But however much I may feel personally mortified and 
outraged at the course pursued, unprecedented at least 
in our< vvn history, I will carry out in good faith while 1 
! remain in Mexico, the views of the government, though I 
j may he sacrificed in the effort. 

I deeply regret to find in j’our letter of January 3, to 
Major General Butler and myself, an allusion to my posi¬ 
tion here, which 1 cannot but consider as an insinuation 
that [ have put myself willingly out of the reach of your 
l communications. I beg leave to remark that the move¬ 
ment of the troops in this direction, and my own march 
hither, were undertaken for public reasons, fully set forth 
I in my reports to the Adjutant General; one ol them being 
my desire to place in position for embarkation to Vera 
Cruz, should the government order an expedition to that 
point, the force (2,000 regulars and 2,000 volunteers,) 
which 1 reported might he spared for that service. 

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, 

Your obedient servant. 

Z- TAYLOR, 

Major General U. S. Jl., Commanding. 

Major General Winfield Scott, 

Commanding U. S. air my, Brazos, Texas. 

But it was not merely the quantum of force 
taken from him, but the manner of taking it, 
which appeared in the sequel to have bad the 






















24 


effect of weakening Taylor, and of exposing 
him with less than 5,000 men to the attack of! 
Santa Anna’s '20,000. Scott took regiments from 
Taylor, having three months to serve,and could 
not, therefore, be expected to serve throughout 
the campaign in the heart of Mexico, and sup- ; 
plied their place consequently, by others that 
would have served had he retained them, ; 
throughout the war—the whole effect of which ; 
was to expose Taylor (whether designed or not) 
to Santa Anna’s blow at Buena Vista, without 
either. He took from Taylor the Georgia, 
Kentucky and Alabama volunteers, the 3d 
and 4th Illinois, the 1st and 2d Tennessee 
foot regiments, and Tennessee cavalry. He 
sent to him the Massachusetts, Virginia, North 
Carolina, Mississippi and Louisiana regiments 
in return. The five regiments taken from 
Taylor had too short a time to serve to reach 
t-he battle-field of the city of Mexico, where the j 
war was to be decided ; and in fact he sent them j 
home from Puebla, and awaited the arrival of I 
the other troops from the United States, which j 
he might have taken with him to make his march 
on the city of Mexico. The consequence ofj 
taking the regiments named from Taylor, was to 
reduce his force to less than 5,000 men to meet 
Santa Anna with 20,000, before the troops sent 
in exchange for them would reach him. Why 
did Scott take Taylor’s volunteer regiments from 
him at such a crisis, and under such circum¬ 
stances, putting them on their march down on 
the Rio Grande, sending the Massachusetts, 
Virginia, Louisiana, North Carolina and Missis¬ 
sippi, from his force up the river to replace them 
at the vast expense of a double transportation of 
two small armies? Was there such a superiority 
in the volunteers under Taylor, over those of the 
States last mentioned, that he felt compelled to | 
reject the one and take the other at whatever cost? 1 
Let it be remembered that the regiments sent to , 
Taylor were to serve during the war; those j 
taken from him had only three months to serve, | 
the former, if Scott had retained them, would 
have accompanied him to the city of Mexico ; 
the latter he was obliged to discharge, and was 
compelled as he admits, to await the arrival of 
other troops from the United States, to supply 
their places, giving Santa Anna time to recover i 
his troops from their successive defeats, and to 
organize a new force for the defence of the city? 
Why did Scott lay the foundation of his own 
complaints, by sending away from him troops 
for the war on the way to Mexico, and some of 
them already advanced to Lobos, to justify the 
withdrawal from Taylor of those having only 
three months to serve? No man can look into 
another’s breast but through his character, and [ 
Scott’s notorious envy and jealousy of every rival, 
and the fact that he was at the moment, entering 
on a race with Taylor in competition for the 
Presidency, to whom Palo Alto and Monterey 
had given the start, furnishes a clue to his 
motives. When Scott’s order for the winnowing 
of Taylor’s remnant of force by taking the vol¬ 
unteers (the regulars having been already de¬ 
manded) was about to be executed, Colonel 
Duncan predicted that Santa Anna (who lay at | 


San Luis between the city of Mexico and 
Buena Vista) would seize the occasion to attack 
and overwhelm Taylor. What the accomplished 
Duncan foresaw and pronounced wouldbe inevita¬ 
ble, was apprehended by many even at Washing¬ 
ton. It is not possibte that the probability of 
such a result could escape the forecast of Scott, 
who had made it the study of his life, to antici¬ 
pate what effect the movement of one body of 
troops would produce in the conduct of the enemy, 
opposed to them. Scott could not shut his eyes 
upon the certainty, that the reduction of Tay¬ 
lor’s force to less than 5,000 men would bring 
upon him Santa Anna’s 20,000 that lay between 
him and the city of Mexico, to defend it from 
his approach. The nation knows how truly 
the result answered all military calculations. 
While Scott was effecting his unnecessary ex¬ 
change of one body of State troops for another 
of volunteers in Taylor’s diminished army— 
while the latter was stripped of a large portion 
of his temporary troops as well as regulars, 
and before those exchanged for them had ar¬ 
rived, he was assailed by Santa Anna, with an 
overwhelming force and saved from .utter dis¬ 
tinction by his own obstinate valor and the 
chivalrous courage of his handful of troops. 
If Taylor had been defeated all the glories of the 
Mexican war would have been in reserve for 
Scott. The ardor of his countrymen would have 
been up, and revenge and patriotism would alike 
have rallied under Scott’s banner, to seek an 
expiation in the heart of Mexico. But Santa 
Anna failed and barely failed at Buena Vista. 
Scott’s strategy however did not fail there. If 
Taylor had retained his regiments which were 
idly madeby Scott to paddle down the RioGrande, 
while others in exchange were made as idly' to 
paddle up the Rio Grande, leaving Buena Vista 
to be maintained by the fragment of an army, 
the consequences of that field would have been 
what Scott may have apprehended—the utter 
overthrow of Santa Anna, and the march of 
Taylor by the direct route on Mexico. 

Scott renews the attack on “high quar¬ 
ters.” 

But afffer Scott had established his army in the 
heart of Mexico—had met Santa Anna with his 
troops, broken and dispirited by their overthrow 
at Buena Vista—had tried them and found that 
they could not resist our strong, daring, indomi¬ 
table soldiers, and now being secure in scatter¬ 
ing the disorganized forces of the enemy and 
capturing the capitol, his jealous feeling turned 
towards those who might, by directing the coun¬ 
cils, providing the means, and sharing the re¬ 
sponsibility attending the conquest, be entitled to 
a participation in its glory. From that moment 
Scott renewed the warfare against those “in high 
quarters,” from whom, he had a little while be¬ 
fore, begged quarter. He looked with an evil 
eye upon the commanding po wer at Washington, 
and although in the midst of a rich Country, in 
which success put everything in his power, his 
complaints were incessant against all the Depart¬ 
ments at Washington, however indefatigable they 
had been in providing men, money and materi- 


% 


















25 


&!—everything indeed to ensure a triumph, on 
which the fate of the administration depended.— 
His dispatches were calculated to make the im¬ 
pression that he derived no support from the Gov¬ 
ernment at home—that all his hopes were dis¬ 
appointed, and that he was really suffering what 
he said in his letter “after a hasty plate of soup,” 

' he had reason to apprehend. In this way he 
artfully prepared, in case of unexpected disaster, 
to throw the whole blame on the Department at 
Washington, and in case ofentire success, to ap¬ 
propriate all the honors to himself. He was still 
looking for the Whig nomination to the Presi¬ 
dency, of which Harrison’s good fortune had de¬ 
prived him in 1840, and therefore, for his own 
sake and the sake of his party, he was doubly anx¬ 
ious to depress the democratic administration. For 
this reason his despatches were filled with com¬ 
plaints ; but at last a startling cause made them 
burst out in open contumacy to the authority 
which had been weak enough after his first inso¬ 
lence to intrust him with the conduct of its forces. 

The President sent Mr. Tristwith overtures of 
peace to Mexico, which he was directed to de¬ 
liver to General Scott, to be forwarded, and to 
remain with the Army as a commissioner to sign 
the treaty, provided the treaty proposed to Mex¬ 
ico should be assented to. This produced a par¬ 
oxysm in General Scott, for he had determined 
that the Government at Washington should have 
neither the creditof directing the war nor of con¬ 
cluding the peace. The force placed at his dis^ 
posal by the Executive put Mexico in his power, 
and he was resolved that no treaty of peace 
should rescue it until he had accomplished the 
object of his own ambition in dictating terms in 
the city of Mexico. He even demurred to allow 
our Government to send propositions for a treaty 
through Mr. l'rist to the Government of Mexi¬ 
co. He says to that gentleman in a letter dated 
May 7, 1847 

44 Senor Amaya is, I bHieve, President ad interim. But J 
you may have learned that Congress, after hearing of the ! 
affair at Cerro Gordo, passed many violent decrees, breath- j 
ing war to the uttermost against the United States; de- j 
daring that the executive has no power, and shall have none, i 
to conclude a treaty, or even an armistice with the United I 
States, and denouncing as a traitor any Mexican functionary j 
who shall entertain either proposition. I have communi- I 
cated a copy of those decrees to the War Department, and ! 
until fin ther orders thereupon, or until a change of circum¬ 
stances, I very much doubt, whether I can so far commit 
the honor of my Government, as to take any direct agency 
in forwarding the sealed despatch you have sent me from the 
Secretary of State of the Uniied States. 

“ On this delicate point, however, you will do as you 
please; and when, if able, I shall have advanced near the 
Capital, I may, at your instance, lend an escort to your flag 
of truce; and it may require a large fighting detachment to 
protect even a flag of truce against the rancheros and ban¬ 
ditti, who now infest the national road, all the way up to the 
Capital. 

44 I see that the Secretary of War proposes to degrade me, 
by requiring that I, the commamkr of this army, shall defer 
to you, the chief clerk of the Department of State, the 
question of continuing or discontinuing hostilities. 

“ I beg to say to him and to you, that here in the heart of 
a hostile country, from which, after a tew w eeks, it would 
be impossible lo withdraw the army without a loss probably, 
of Halt its numbers by the vojnito, which army, from neces 
sity must soon become, a self sustaining machine, cut off 
from all supplies and reinforcements from home, until per¬ 
haps, late in November—not to speak of the bad faith of the 
Government and people of Mexico—I say, in reference to 
those critical circumstances, this army must take military 


security for its own safety. Hence, the question of an ar¬ 
mistice or no armistice is most peculiarly a military question, 
appertaining of necessity, if not of universal right, in the 
absence of direct instructions, to the commander of the in¬ 
vading forcesconsequently, if you are not clothed with 
military rank over me, as well as with diplomatic functions, 
I shall demand, under the peculiar circumstances, that, in 
your negotiations, if the enemy shall entertain your over¬ 
tures, you refer that question to me,and all the securities be¬ 
longing to it. '1 he safety of tins army demands no iess, and 
lam responsible for that safety until duly superseded or re¬ 
called. Indeed, from the nature of the case, if the enemy, 
on your petition, should be willing to concede an armistice, 
he would, no doubt, demand the military guaranty of my 
signature for his own safety. 

Should you, under the exposition of circumstances I have 
given, visit the moveable head quarters of this army. I shall 
receive you witli the respect due to a functionary of my 
government; but whether you would find me here, or at 
Perote, Puebla, or elsew here, depends on events changeable 
at every moment. 

“ The sealed despatch from the Department of State. I 
suppose you desire me to hold until your arrival, or until I 
shall hear further from you. 

“ I am, Sir, respectfully vour obedient servant, 

WINFIELD SCOTT A 

On the 31st of May, 1847, Mr. Marcy wrote 
to General Scott as follows : 

44 It is an unpleasant duty to advert, as I feel constrained 
to do, to your letter of the 17th instant, and more particu¬ 
larly to a copy of one of the same date, therewith enclosed, 
addressed by you to Mr. 'l'rist. With me it is a matter of 
sincere regret that a letter of such an extraordinary character 
was sent to that gentleman ; and I cannot doubt it will be no 
less regretted by yourself on more reflection, and better in¬ 
formation. Such information you would have received had 
Mr. 'l'rist delivered in person, as I had no doubt he would, 
my letter to you of the 14th instant, [ultimo,] with the de¬ 
spatch from the State Department to the Mexican Minister 
of Foreign Relations. My letter would have secured you 
from the strange mistake into which you have fallen, by re¬ 
garding him as the bearer of that despatch to the Mexican 
Government, and yourself called on to aid in transmitting 
it. Had such been the true state of the case, I cannot per¬ 
ceive that you would have had any just ground of complaint, 
or any sufficient excuse for withholding the assistance re¬ 
quired; but by looking at my letter, you will discover your 
misapprehension. Mr. Trist was the bearer of that despatch 
to yourself—not to the Mexican Government, and w hen he 
had delivered it into your hands, his agency ceased; he had 
no discretion or judgment to exercise in regard to sending 
on or withholding it. This was a matter comm tted solely 
to yourself. I refer to the language of my letter to shew the 
entire correctness of this view of the subject. 44 You will 
transmit that despatch to the commander of the Mexican 
forces, with a request that it may be laid before his Govern¬ 
ment, at the same time, giving information that Mr. Trist, 
an officerfrom our Department for foreign affairs, next in rank 
to its chief, is at your head-quarters, or on board the squad¬ 
ron, as the case maybe.’ This is a positive instruction to 
yourself tof send that despatch forward; and it is expected 
you will haveacted upon it without waiting for the arrival of 
Mr. Trist at your head-quarters, if thereby any unnecessary 
delay was likely to result. 

44 My letter Informed you that Mr. Trist w as 44 clothed 
with diplomatic powers’” and his instmetions and the pro¬ 
ject of treaty which he carried with him, have ere this ap¬ 
prized you that he is a commissioner with full powers to ne¬ 
gotiate a peace. The treaty which he was authorized to 
conclude, contains an article, as you will have perceived, 
which provides fer a suspension of hostilities, but not until 
after the treaty shall have been ratified by the Mexican Gov¬ 
ernment. Neither the considerations of humanity nor sound 
policy would justify the continuance of active military op¬ 
erations, after a treaty of peace had been concluded and rati¬ 
fied on the part of Mexico, until the information of that fact 
could be communicated from Mexico to this place, and an 
order for the suspension of hostilities hence transmitted to the 
commanding general in that country. It will not be ques¬ 
tioned that a commissioner of peace may be properly vested 
w ith the power of agreeing to a suspension of hostilties in a 
definitive treaty, negotiated and already ratified by one par¬ 
ty, while waiting the ratification of the other. As the nego¬ 
tiator is the first to know the fact, that a treaty has been 
concluded and so ratified, it is beyond dispute, proper th*t 
he should be directed to communicate the knowledge of ; j' a t 
fact to the commanding General. and it cannot, in mv view 
of the case, be derogatory to that officer, to be placed under 























26 


instructions to act with reference to that fact, when duly no- 
nifi<*d of it by the Commissioner. The case cannot be made 
plainer, or your misapprehensions in regard to it more ch ar- 
ty pointed out, than by simply stating 1 it as it must exist, if 
*he contingency should fortunately happen, on which you 
will be required to suspend hostilities. A Commissioner of 
peace is sent by the President to your head-quarters, and he 
makes known to you his authority to receive from Mexico 
offers for concluding a peace. You are informed by his in¬ 
structions, and the projet of a treaty which he is required 
to exhibit to you, that on the conclusion and ratification of 
a treaty of peace by Mexico, hostilities immediately thereafter 
are to cease. With all these facts fully made known to you 
»si advance, you are directed by the President to suspend hos¬ 
tilities, on receiving written notice from ihe Commissioner 
that the contingency—the conclusion and ratification of a 
treaty of peace by Mexico—has happened. Under these 
circumstances, can you conceive that, as commanding Gene¬ 
ral of the force in Mexico, you have the right to raise a 
question upon your duty to obey this direction, coming as it 
does through a proper channel, from your superior—the 
Command* r-in-chief? In my opinion, you could not have 
wandered farther from the true view of I lie case, than by sup¬ 
posing that the President or myself has placed you ip the 
condition of defi rnng “ to the chief clerk of the Department 
•f Slate, the question of continuing or discontinuing hos¬ 
tilities.” 1 cannot conceive that any well-founded exception 
can be taken to the order you have received in relation to 
suspending hostilities; and I am fully persuaded, that if 
the contingency requiring you to act upon it shall ever occur, 
you will promptly carry it into full effect. 

“ I am, very respectfully, vour obedient servant, 

W. L. MARCY, 
Secretary of War.” 

Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott. 

The letter written to Mr. Trist was intend¬ 
ed for and sent immediately to the Secretary. 
In it will be found a gratuitous fling at Commodore 
Perry who had sent Lieutenant Semmes of the 
navy to Head Quarters, with a view of being 
forwarded by Gen. Scott to the city of Mexico, 
to make proper representations to save the 
life of Lieut. Rogers, who was- taken prisoner 
by the Mexicans, and whose life was threatened 
as a spy. He was Incensed at Col. Wilson for 
detaching a guard from Vera Cruz to protect 
Lieut. Semmes and was provoked also that the 
commissioner Mr. Trist, should have been as¬ 
sisted in reaching Head Quarters, although he 
had the authority of the President to command 
the necessary means of reaching his destination. 
But after offering this indirect insult, through 
Mr. Trist, to the Department at Washington, 
Commodore Perry and Lieut. Semmes, General 
Scott in conversation with Lieut. Semmes yield¬ 
ed to his application and consented to put him 
in communication with the Mexican authorities, 
or least forward his despatches. Yet such was 
his repugnance to the President’s having access 
by an agent to the city of Mexico, that he revoked 
his promise; whereupon Lieut. Semmes ad¬ 
dressed him this note : 

Head Quarters of the Army, 

Jalap a, May 8, 1847. 

‘ ‘General: I understood you to say in the conversation I had 
the honor to hold with you on the evening of my arrival at 
this place, that although you had no escort then at your com¬ 
mand, with which to forward me to the city of Mexico, in 
the execution of iny mission, I might continue with the 
army in its progress, and that when you should reach some 
convenient point near t le city, you would eiilier put me in 
personal communication with the Government, or send for¬ 
ward my despatches. 

“I have this morning,been waited upon by Lieutenant 
Williams, your aid-de-camp, who informs niein your behalf, 
rial you have changed your resolution on this point, and 
th.x» you will not permit me to hold any intercourse with the 
Mexican government. 

"* Commodore Perry has been charged by the President of 
the Uniyd States, to make a communication to the Gov- 


' eminent of Mexico, with trie nature of which you have been 
made acquainted. He has selected me to carry out the views 
of the President, and has directed me to apply to you for the 
mean- of executing his orders. 

“With regard to the question, as to who is the proper 
channel through which this communication is to be made, I 
can, of course, have nothing t > say V that must be settled by 
higher authority; but the President has thought proper t« 
judge of this for himself, and I am here by authority (imme¬ 
diately) of one of the Departments of the Government, as 
hi> humble agent. I have specific orders from my Com¬ 
mander-in-chief to place personally, with your assistance, my 
despatches in the hands of the Minister of Foreign Relations; 
or, if (he Mexican Government w ill not permit me to pro¬ 
ceed to the Capital, in person, to forward it by some 
safe conveyance, and await an answer. My object in 
addressing 5 011 this note, is to inquire, whether I understand 
you as deciding that you will nut, at your convenience, af¬ 
ford me the facilities requested of you by Commodore Perry, 
to enable me to proceed oh my mission, and that you will 
not permit me to hold any intercourse, personal or otherwise, 
j with the Mexican Government. If this be your decision, as 
1 a military man, you must see the propriety of giving it to me 
in writing, in order ilia. I may exhibit it to my Commander* 
j in-chief, as a sufficient reason for failing to execute his or- 
ders; as soon as I receive this, I shall hold myself in nadiness 
! to return to the squadron by the first conv< yance. 

I enclose foryour inspection, my order'in the premises, 
I from Commodore Perry, together with a copy of the des¬ 
patch of that o 1 cer to the Mexican government, from which 
you will he able to see (hat my mission cannot have in the 
* remotest degree, any hearing upon your military operations, 
j I will he obliged to you if you w ill return me these papers 
I after perus d. 

I have the honor to be, very resp 1 ctfully. your obedient 
! servant, 

R. SEMMES. 

Lieut. U. S. N-avy. 

I Major Gen. Winfield Scott, 

C'oTO’g the Armies of the United States. 

| To which the General returned a captious an¬ 
swer; and after a rigmarole of what he, the Gen¬ 
eral, had and would have done for Lieut. Rogers 
1 concludes thus : 

General Scott to Lieut. Semmes. 

“ I regret that Commodore Perry lias thought it necessary 
to send you as his special messenger to treat w ith the Mexican 
government on the subject of Mr. Rogers, even if I had been 
ignorant of the capture and position of the passed midship- 
man.a note from the commodore would have been sufficient 
to have interested me officially and personally in hisfate, and 
I doubt the expediency of more than one channel of com¬ 
munication with the Mexican government on such subjects, 
j “But there is at hand, another functionary, who under 
j very recent instructions from the President of the United 
States, may perhaps, claim to supersede me in the business of 
exchanging p isoners of war, as on other military arrange¬ 
ments. Mr. Trist, chief clerk of the Department of State, 
appointed minister or commissioner to Mexico, lias arrived 
at Vera Cruz, and may beat this place with the train ex¬ 
pected in a few days. Perhaps you had better refer the bus¬ 
iness of your mission to him. I only make the suggestion. 

1 “ The difficulty of sending forward a flag of truce at this 

time with communications to the Mexican government, if 
there be a competent government any where, consists in the 
necessity of protecting the flag, by a large escort, against 
ranehtros or banditti who infest the road all the way to the 
Capital, and w ho rob and murder even Mexican officers re¬ 
turning on their parole to their friends. 

“When nearer to the Capital, some time hence, I mar 
nevertheless have occasion to communicate officially, under 
the cover of a flag and a heavy escort, with any body that 
may be then in authority on the subject of prisoners of war 
generally. Your communication and any that Mr. Trist 
may desire to submit, may g > by thesame opportunity. In 
the mean time you can remain here, return to Commodore 
Perry’s squadron, or advance with the army, as may seem *0 
you best. 1 have no advice to offer on the subject. 

********** 

“With high personal respect, I remain yours, truly, 

WINFIELD SCOTT.” 

Lieut. R. Semmes, 

U. S. Navy, 4‘c. 

The heart of every man who feels for the dig¬ 
nity of his Government must sicken to see the 
humiliation to which Scott subjects the Presi- 




















27 


dent’s agents—the one sent to negotiate a peace, 
the other to protect the life of a gallant officer, 
threatened with the gallows, and charged as a 
spy—from which ignominious charge it was the 
object of this mission of a naval officer to acquit 
him, as being acquainted with all the circumstan¬ 
ces that implicated him. But General Scott was 
not done with Mr. Trist. That functionary, who 
was the grandson-in-law of Jefferson, had been his 
private Secretary—the private Secretary of Gen¬ 
eral Jackson—consul at Havana, under Mr. 
Van Buren—the first officer under Mr. Buchan¬ 
an in the State Department—a man of unblem¬ 
ished character, kind manners and finished edu¬ 
cation, felt it due to himself as well as the station 
he was sent to occupy—of commissioner to treat 
of peace—the representative of the President, 
with his terms and instructions in his pocket, to 
demand a compliance on the part of the General 
with the President’s orders. Pie did so in an elabo¬ 
rate letter which General Scott treats with scorn. 
To this the General .gends the following reply : * 

General Scott to Mr. Trist. 

“Head Quarters of the Army, 

“ Puebla, May 29, 1847. 

“Sir: Your long studied letters of the 9th and 20th in¬ 
stant, making thirty pages, in reply to my short note of 
the 7th, were handed to me under one cover at Jalapa, 
the morning or the 21 st, when you knew, being on the 
spot, that 1 was about to march upon this place. Occu¬ 
pied as 1 was with business of much higher importance, l 
did not allow the seal of the package to be broken till the | 
evening of the 22 d, which t took care to have done in the 
presence of many staii officers. One of them at my in- j 
stance, read apart and reported to me the general charac¬ 
ter of the papers. I have not yet read them. 

“My first impulse was to return the farrago ofinsolcnee, 
conceit and arrogance, to the author; but on reflection, 1 
have determined to preserve the letters as a choice speci¬ 
men of diplomatic literature and manners. The Jacobin 
convention of i‘'rance never sent to one of its armies in 
die field, a more amiable and accomplished instrument. 
If you were but armed with an ambulatory guillotine, you 
would be the personification of Danton, Marat, and St. 
Just, all in one. 

“You tell me that you are authorized to negotiate a 
treaty of peace with the enemy, a declaration which, as 
it rests upon your own word, 1 might well question ; and 
you add, that it was not intended at Washington, that 1 
should have any thing to do with the negotiation. This 
i can well believe, and certainly have cause to be thank¬ 
ful to the President for not degrading me by placing me in 
any joint commission with you. 

“ From the letter of the Secretary of War to me, of the 
14th ultimo, I had supposed you to be simply authorized 
to propose or concede to the enemy, the truce or armis¬ 
tice which usually precedes negotiations for a peace ; and 
my letter to you was written on that supposition. If the 
tennsof military conventions are left to me, the command¬ 
er of this army, l have nothing more to desire or to de¬ 
mand for its safety. 

“ in conclusion—for many persons here believe that the 
enemy 20,000 strong, is about to attack this place —1 have 
only time to ask you in your future communications to 
me, to be brief and purely official; for if you dare to use 
the style of orders and instructions again, or to indulge 
yourself in a single discourteous phrase, I shall throw 
back the communication with the contempt and scorn 
which you merit at my hands.” 

“ I remain, sir, officially, &c., 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 

To Nicholas P. TrisF, Esq., &c., &c., &c. 

A true copy, 

GEO. VV. RAINS, 

Lieutenant and Acting Aid de Camp.” 

When the Government at Washington saw, 
from the course of Genl. Scott towards Mr. 


Trist, that as far as the influence of the Com- 
mander-in-Chief could accomplish it, the com¬ 
missioner would be stript of all respect in our 
own army, and if allowed to communicate with 
the Mexican administration at all, would want 
its support, it was concluded to recall Mr. Trist, 
and.to send the Attorney General of the United 
States, Mr. Clifford, and Mr. Sevier, of the 
United States Senate, to manage the affair of the 
Treaty. General Scott had, however, by this 
time, become convinced, that having thus hum¬ 
bled Mr. Trist by his tyrannical abuse of the arbi¬ 
trary will he exerted in Mexico, it, would not 
be good policy to repeat the experiment upon 
more exalted civilians who might be sent to 
his army. It might not suit his ulterior presi¬ 
dential aims, and he therefore resolved that he 
would change his course towards Mr. Trist, and 
by forwarding his object and assuming the lion’s 
part in the business, appropriate the honors of 
both the war and peace-making power. So 
from brutal insult and oppression, he suddenly 
transformed his conduct to bland and concilia¬ 
tory kindness. Two months after he had com¬ 
municated his letter, making poor Mr. Trist 
blend in himself, Danton, Marat, and St. Just, 
and an ambulatory guillotine, he writes the fol¬ 
lowing diarming account of Mr. i nst and of the 
“happy change” in their relations : — 

General Scott to the Secretary of War. 

“ Head Quarters of the Army, 

Puebla , July 2.7, 1847. 

“Sir: My last report was dated the 14th ultimo, from 
this place, enclosing a copy of my instructions (June 3) to 
Col. Childs, ordering up the garrison of Jalapa, and a,copy 
of a letter from me to Mr. Trist, of May 29. 

“Although daily in expectation of something of special 
interest to communicate, nothing has occurred of that 
character, save a happy change in my relations, both offi¬ 
cial and private, with Mr. Trist. Since about the 26th 
ultimo, our intercourse has been frequent and cordial; 
and I have found him able, discreet, courteous and amia¬ 
ble. At home, it so chanced that we had but the slightest 
possible acquaintance with each other. Hence more or 
less of reciprocal prejudice, and of the existence of his 
feelings towards me, I knew (by private letters) before we 
met, that at least a part of the Cabinet had full intimation. 

“Still the pronounced misunderstanding between Mr. 
Trist and myself could not have occurred but for other 
circumstances: 1st, his being obliged to send forward 
your letter of April 14th, instead of delivering it in person 
will) the explanatory papers which he desired to commu¬ 
nicate ; 2d, His bad health in May and June, which, 1 am 
happy to say has now become good ; and 3d, The extreme 
mystification into which your letter, and particularly an 
interlineation, unavoidably threw me. 

“So far as 1 am concerned, 1 am perfectly willing that 
all I have heretofore wiitten to the Department about Mr. 
Trist, should be suppressed. I make this declaration as 
due to my present esteem for that gentleman ; but ask no 
favor and desire none at the hands of the Department. 
Justice to myself, however tardy, I shall take care to have 
done. 

********** 

“You will perceive that 1 ain aware, (as 1 have long 
been) of the dangers which hang over me at home : but I 
too, am a citizen of the United States, and well know the 
obligations imposed under all circumstances by an en¬ 
lightened patriotism. 

“Having, June 3d, lost all hope of being joined by other 
troops than the nine hundred and odd men belonging to 
the old regiments of this army, and of whose approach I 
had had notice from the Adjutant General, I ordered up 
Col. Childs with the garrison from Jalapa; but instructed 
him to wait for that body, and any other (i was thinking 
only of some other parties of recruits,) lie might @ha»e« 























28 


to hear of. He waited first, for Col. McIntosh ; next for 
Brigadier General Cadwalader, who in turn, heard of and i 
waited ior Major General Pillow. The latter arrived here 
with all those detachments, the 8th instant. But in the j 
meantime,1 had heard, that Brigadier General Pierce had 
reached V era Cruz on the 28th June, and was to take 
up his line of march at the latest, the fid instant. Conse¬ 
quently 1 expected him here with much confidence by the 
17th, but tile day before, 1 learned with great disappoint¬ 
ment that the want of transportation and an accident 
would detain him at Vera Cruz liil the 16th—of course l 
cannot now look for him before the end of this month. 

1 shall be obliged to wait his certain and near approach ; 
1 st, because we need the strong reinforcement he will 
bring up; and 2d, the money supposed to be with him 
is indispensable. 

“ in respect to money, I beg* again to report, that the 
chief commissary (Oapt. Grayson,) of this army has not 
received a dollar from the United States since we landed 
at Vera Cruz, March fi. 

********** 

“ 1 have the honor to remain, with high respect, your 
most obedient servant, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 

Hon. YV. L. Marcy, 

Secretary of War .” 

It will be observed that although Scott had re¬ 
lented entirely as regarded Mr. Trist, yet he had J 
not at all relaxed in animosity to the administra¬ 
tion. lie would have “no favor and desired j 
none from the department.' 5 Although Mr. 
Trist was “a6/e, discreet, courteous, and amiable,” 
and he had taken him entirely into his confidence 
and could apologise for him touching their “pro¬ 
nounced misunderstanding, 55 yet he did not in¬ 
tend to pardon the Executive for sending him to 
make a peace at Ins expense. JN T o, no. “Jus¬ 
tice to myself, however tardy, i shall take care 
to have done. ” 

What a misfortune it was to Genl. Scott, that. 
Genl. Jackson had not been at the head of the 
administration while he headed the army. Nei- ; 
liter the hasty plate of soup letter, nor any of 
the supercilious notes dishonoring the chief ma¬ 
gistracy of our country, would have been indited ! 
by him. Genl. Jackson had given Genl. Scott ; 
an early lesson on the subject of wielding a loose 
tongue, and a later one on that of wielding a 
loose pen. The lirst has already been noticed— 
the last occurred while Genis. Scott and Jesup 
were engaged together m the Creek war. Scott’s j 
jealousy was roused about some successful 
movement of Jesup, and he began a wrangling 
correspondence in consequence. The moment the 
Secretary of ^ War (Mr. Cass) brought the let¬ 
ters to the notice of the President, Scott was re*- 
caiied—Scott had rendered himself obnoxious to 
many citizens of Florida, who had burned his 
effigy, and his immediate recall was earnestly de¬ 
manded by Mr. White, the delegate, in a letter 
addressed to the President. 

After settling the affair with Mr. Trist to his 
satisfaction, Gen. Scott next showed his contu¬ 
macy to ms Government, by declining to let it 
have even a scrap of official intelligence. In 
October, the Secretary writes : 

“Sir: — No official dispatch has been received, from you 
at this Department of a later date than that of the 4th, of 
June, though we are not without authentic information of 
your operations to the 20th of Jhigust.” 

.Not a syllable would he write, and we shall 
see presently, that he undertook to punish the 
most distinguished officers in his army, for al¬ 


lowing the people of the United States and gov¬ 
ernment to get “ the authentic information ” of 
which the Secretary speaks, through other chan¬ 
nels. Another letter of similar import reminded 
the General that the Government had a right to 
know from him what the army was doing and 
intended to do. In vain. The whole summer and 
part of the fall was suffered to pass, after his de¬ 
fiance of the Government in regard t,o its com¬ 
missioner. This was not less to mark his con¬ 
tempt for the civil authorities of his country, 
than to shew, that he meant to carry out the 
threat of his first letter repulsing Mr. Trist, and 
the authority that sent him, that of making his 
army independent. 

“ I beg to say to him [the Secretary of War] and 
to you, Mr. Trist, that here in the heart of a hostile coun¬ 
try, from which, after a few weeks, it would be impos¬ 
sible to withdraw this army, without a loss probably of 
one half its numbers by the vomito, which army , from 
necessity must soon become a self sustaining machine, 
cut off from all supplies and reinforcements, from home, 
until, perhaps, late in November, not to speak of the bad 
faith of the Government and people of Mexico—I say in 
reference to these critical cirrcumstances, this army mitst 
take militarffisecurity for its own safety .” 

This was the ground upon which he put his 
refusal in May, to allow Mr. Trist to carry out 
the orders of his government, to make a treaty 
of peace upon the terms h^was authorized to 
offer, anti to make an armistice after they were 
ratified by Mexico. 

“I shall demand, Under the peculiar circumstances, 
that, in your negotiations, if the enemy should entertain 
your overtures, you refer that question 'to me, and all the 
securities belonging to it.” 

The army then, was to become “« self sus¬ 
taining machine,” by denying the authority of 
the President of the United States to enter into 
an armistice, and he took effectual measures to 
prevent it, by refusing an escort for the Com- 
missoner to the Mexican Capital. But no soorfer 
had he found that Mr. Trist was recalled, and 
the Attorney General and Senator Sevier were 
deputed in his place, than he himself made an 
armistice in advance to invite a treaty, instead 
of making the war until the treaty was stipu¬ 
lated ; and he thus enabled Santa Anna, while 
he suspended the war, to make fresh prepa¬ 
rations for defence, and this deceptive truce cost 
the li\es of multitudes of our brave men, who 
could have marched into the defenceless city, 
after the battle of Churubusco, without storm¬ 
ing those strong holds, Molino del Rev and 
Chapultepee, which the armistice gave 'Santa 
Anna time to arm and fill with troops. If the 
Government had proposed to do what Scott did, 
to make an armistice before a treaty, and had so 
exposed and sacrificed such a hecatomb of pa¬ 
triotic officers arid soldiers, there would have 
been some pretext for the opposition of the 
General, though even then no justification for 
his mutiny against orders of the Chief Magis¬ 
trate, the Commander-in-Chief. Gen’l Scott 
had not only the audacity and indiscretion thus 
to invert the orders of the Government, con¬ 
tained in Mr. Trist’s instructions—by grasping 
at a treaty through a truce made most destruc¬ 
tive to his army, but he afterwards prosecuted 
his purpose through Mr. Trist, after he knew 






















29 


he was recalled by the Government, and the 
negotiation committed to other hands. This j 
was carrying out his design, which is apparent 
in all his correspondence from the moment lie 
felt that circumstances put him beyond recall— 
that of denying to the administration any credit 
for making the war or the peace. Being in the 
saddle at the head of the army, in the heart of 
Mexico, in the midst of a campaign which had 
Gost the administration so much to provide for, 
he knew it would not take the risk of arresting 
the movements of the army by changing the 
commander, nor risk the mischief of the insub¬ 
ordination to which he shewed such a tendency, 
and which might throw impediments in the way 
of a successor. 

Scott’s War on those who fought his 
Battles in Mexico. 

The war over, Genl. Scott’s next concern was 
to take all the glory of the achievement from the 
officers who had most distinguished themselves, 
and stood in positions at home likely to bring 
them forward for the civil honors of the govern¬ 
ment. Pillow was in Genl. Jackson’s State—a 
State commanding great influence in the south¬ 
west—was greatly favored by the then Presi¬ 
dent,—was a lawyer of some eminence,—had 
been under fire in all the battles from Vera Cruz 
to Mexico,—was twice severely wounded, and 
had been lucky in some manoeuvres made by 
him on his own responsibility. Scott, who had 
been but little exposed to the enemy’s fire, dur¬ 
ing the whole Mexican war, had his jealousy 
aroused by the lucky shots Pillow had received 
as well as by his lucky hits as a General, at 
Contreras and Chapultepec. Hewce his quarrel 
with General Pillow, and attempt to disgrace 
him by a trial before a court of enquiry. 

Worth was a son of the Empire State,—was 
Scott’s Aid in the battle of Lundy’s Lane,—was 
distinguished for his gallantry and the wounds 
received in that battle,—lir.d gathered fresh lau¬ 
rels in Florida, and with Genl. Taylor soon af¬ 
ter his first battles in Mexico, covering himself 
with glory for skill as well as bravery at Monte¬ 
rey,—had been the Marshall Ney of the army in 
its bloodiest fight—the Molino del Rey,—and had 
opened the gates of the city of Mexico to Genl. 
Scott, on the day of the fall of Chapultepec. 
This was enough to draw down on him the 
envy of Genl. Scott and an attempt to disgrace 
him. 

Duncan and his famous Battery of Cannon, 
now kept at the arsenal at Washington, in its 
battered condition, as the proudest relic of the 
war with Mexico, had won at Palo Alto, Resaca 
and Monterey, so much renown,—had, from 
Vera Cruz until he fought the way for both 
Worth’s and Quitman’s columns into the gates 
of the city of Mexico, so nobly redeemed, un¬ 
der Scott, the promise created under Taylor,— 
had, with such triumphs, become so identified 
with the feelings of his country, that the Genl. 
could not brook the eclat with which the Ameri¬ 
can press re-echoed the peals of Duncan and his 
battery. Besides, Duncan, when Scott had 


taken his measures to march upon the city of 
Mexico, by the way of Mexicalciengo, under the 
impression, from his reconnoisances, that the 
way round Chaleo was impassable, had set him 
right by his own better reconnoissances. In 
carrying Mexicalcingo, “the attacking troops, 
(an officer accompanying them says,) would be 
confined to the-breadth of the road, and in their 
I advance for three-fourths of a mile, receiving the 
raking and cross fire of many guns in seven or 
eight separate batteries embanked and built on a 
marsh, the road being a causeway through the 
marsh to the fortress.” “From such a battle,” 
continues the narrative of the officer, published 
recently in the Democratic Review, “we believe 
Col. Duncan saved the American army. He 
said to Genl. Worth, instead of examining the 
Mexican guides and spies, why not examine the 
road? Genl. Worth fully concurring with him, 
ordered the reconnoisance, and then sent Col. 
Duncan to report its results to the General-in- 
Chief at Ayotla, with a letter strongly advising 
the movement of the whole army by the Chaleo 
route. The whole country is aware of the bril¬ 
liant results of this movement.” The private 
history of this transaction,—of Pillow’s success¬ 
ful manoeuvre at Contreras, and storm of Chap¬ 
ultepec,—of Worth's bloody victory at Molino 
del Rey, would, if told, show the cause of Scott’s 
jealousy and of the persecution of the distin¬ 
guished officers to which he addressed himself 
when tile war was over. The case of Molino 
del Pv.ey was striking. Scott took it for a can¬ 
non foundry. If it had been, it could not make 
cannon to do mischief in the assault of Mexico, 
which was to take place in a few days. It was 
in fact a fortified mill. It was urged that it was 
of no use when taken, and yet in spite of re¬ 
monstrances to this effect, he persisted, like Don 
I Quixotte, in the attack on the mill, but he found 
| it, instead of a bouse filled with machinery and 
! materials for manufactures of any sort, a terri- 
1 ble military cover, concealing an army, like the 
' Trojan Horse. Worth took it at the cost of near¬ 
ly a thousand men, and it was immediately 
j abandoned as a worthless conquest. This blun¬ 
der ef the General which brought glory only to 
J the immolated troops and their daring leader, 
provoked deep indignation in the obstinate man, 
who felt a deep censure in a simple relation ot 
the facts,—unjustly ascribing their promulgation 
i in the United States, as well as the notices of the 
! approach to Mexico, and the affair of Contreras, 
to the persons distinguished by the events, he 
published this general order :— 


“Head Quarters of the Army, 
Mexico, Nov. 12, 1847. 

“General Orders, No. 349. 

“The attention of certain officers of this army is recalled 
to the foregoing regulation, which the General-in chief is 
resolved to enforce so far as it may be in his power. 

“As yet, but two echoes from home, of the brilliant op- 
| orations of our arms, in this basin, have reached us—the 
} first in a New Orleans, and the second through a Tam- 
I pico newspaper. 

j “It requires not a little charity to believe that the prin- 
: cipal heroes of the scandalous letters alluded to, did not 
| write them, or especially procure them to be written, and 
j the intelligent can be at no loss in conjecturing the authors 
| —chiefs, partizans, and pet familiars. To the honor of 
the service, the disease—pruriency of fame, »o£'earne;4— 


























30 


cannot have seized upon half a dozen officers, (present) 
all of whom, it is believed, belong to the same two co 
teries. 

“False on dit may, no doubt, be obtained at home, by j 
such despicable, self puffing and malignant exclusion of 
others ; but at the expense of the just esteem and consid- I 
eration of all honorable officers who love their country, [ 
their profession and the truth of history. The indignation [ 
of the great number of the latter class cannot fail, in the | 
end, to bring down the conceited .and the envious to their | 
proper level. 

By command of Major Gen. Scott, 

' II. L. SCOTT, 

A. A. A. G.” 

EutScott was not satisfied with this expression 
of his feelings. He arrested these officers, re¬ 
solved to bring them to trial before a military s 
court to degrade them. The result of the court 
of enquiry, in the ease of Pillow, was positive 1 
proof, that lie did not write the letter extolling! 
his conduct in the newspapers referred to by | 
Scott, and positive proof that the movement on 1 
the village, which put Contreras in the power of I 
our army, and decided the fall of that point of’j 
defence, was made by Pillow, and that Scott j 
knew nothing of it, until he saw from a distant 
height, the troops in motion, and learned from 
Pillow the object they were sent to attain, which j 
Scott approved, but had no right to claim as he 
did, the honor of originating. His attempt 
against Pillow was therefore foiled. 

The result as to Duncan was a voluntary 
abandonment of his charges on the part of Scott 
before the court. 

The character of the charge against General 
Worth and its fate will be found m the following | 
extract from a letter of the Secietary at War to ; 
General Scott: 

The Secretary of War to General Scott. 

War Department, 

January , 13, 1848. 

Sir : Since I addressed you on the 14th of December, the 
fdltowing communications have been received, viz : Your ! 
despatches, Nos. 30, 3 ; , 37, 38, 39, copy of the correspon¬ 
dence between yourself and Commodore shubrick, his letter j 
of tite 16th ot November, and yours in reply, of the 2d of 
December, and copies of charges anil specifications against ; 
Major General Pillow, Brevet Major General Worth, and 
Brevet Lieutenant Co onel Duncan. 

The perusal ol' these communications by the President has j 
forced upon his mind the painful conviction that there exists | 
a state of things, at the head-quarters of the army, which 
is exceedingly detrimental to the public service, and im¬ 
periously calls upon him to interpose in such a woy as will, 
he sincerely hopes, arrest and put an end to the feuds and 
dissensions which there prevail. 

After the fullest consideration of the subject, the President 
has not been able to give his approval to tiie course you have 
adopted towards Brevet Major General Worth ; and, for rea¬ 
sons which I will briefly state, he defers for the present, at 
least, to order a court martial for his trial on the charge 
you have presented against him. The documents show that. 
General Worth felt deeply aggrieved by your “ general 
order No. 349.” Imputations of a very serious character 
were by that order cast upon some of the officers under your 
immediate command, and from its peculiar phraseology, it 
was understood by Gen. Worth, or others, as indicating him 
as one of the officers obnoxious to the severe censure and re¬ 
proof therein contained. With this view of the import and 
object of the order, his attempt by all proper means to re¬ 
move from himself the ignominy of these imputations, can¬ 
not be regarded as an exceptionable course on his part. As 
tite stroke w hich had, as lie thought, deeply wounded his 
honor as an officer and his character as a man, come from 
your hands, his application for redress w as properly made to 
you, but as lie did not obtain such redress, as he believed, 
under the circumstances of the case was due to him, he ex¬ 
ercised or attempted to exercise the right of appeal to su¬ 
perior authority. If he was actually aggrieved in this mat- 
tier or believed himself to be so, he had an unquestionable 


right to have the Subject brought to the consideration of his 
and your common superior, the President of the United 
States. He prepared charges against you, (for his letter of 
the 16th of November, to the Secretary ol War can be 
viewed in no other character,) and endeavored to send them 
though y u, the only channel he could use without violating 
established regulations, to his common superior. For the 
matter contained in these charges against yourself, you hai« 
made a charge against him, forwarded it to the President, 
and asked for bis trial by a court martial. If the course of 
proceeding which you propose in tins case is sanctioned and 
carried out, you cannot but perceive that the pieccdent will 
be most fatal to the essential rights of all subordinate officers- 
If General Worth lias been guilty of an offetyce by ore paring 
and attempting to transmit charges against you to the Presi¬ 
dent, for wrongs and injuries alleged to have been inflicted 
by you on him, it seems to be a necessary- cons* qui nce that, 
whatever may be the character of the ivrungs and injuries in¬ 
flicted upon subordinate officers by their superiors, they can¬ 
not seek redress by appeal without being involved in a mili¬ 
tary offence. Whatever may be the injustice they suffer, t!>* 
hope of remedy by appeal would be illusory, and the right 
to appeal worse than valueless, if, by the nine statement 
their complaint, whether in the form of charges or otherwise, 
for the action ot a common superior, they would be liable to Ik* 
arrest; d and tried before any investigation had been made of 
the truth or falsity of the matters therein set forth, and even 
before the appeal had reached the authority which alone 
could afford redress. Sueli a principle as this would in its 
practical operations, subvert justice and withhold protection 
from subordinate officers. 

Very respectfully, jour obedient servant, 

W. L M VRCY. 

Map Gen. Winfield Scott, 

Commanding U. S. army, Mexico. 

The frivolous pretext on which Scott put 
Worth under arrest, and called for a court 
martial, was, evidently, not the true motive for 
this indignity, and that contained in the General 
Order 349, above quoted. His real provocation 
grew out of a letter Worth addressed to him, 
some time before, which estopped the General-in- 
Chief m an effort he made to depreciate his ser¬ 
vice and success in the taking the City of Mexico, 
and previously at Molino del Iley—Worth’s 
letter and General Scott’s endorsement leave 
nothing for comment. 

Worth’s Letter. 

City of Mexico, Dec. 29, 1847. 

Sir: In the official report of the capline of the city of 
Mexico, dated September 18, 1847,” republished in the 
“ Star,” newspaper, and which I had an opportunity of see¬ 
ing,’yesterday, for the first time, the following paragraph 
occurs: 

“ Within those disgarnislied works I found our troops en¬ 
gaged in a street fight against the enemy posted in gardens, 
at windows, and on house tops, afl flat, with parapets. Worth 
ordered forward the mounted howitzers of Cadwalader’s 
brigade, preceded by skirmishers and pioneers, and pickaxes 
and crowbars to force windows and doors, or to burrow 
through walls. The assailants were soon in an equality of 
position fatal to the enemy. By 8 o’clock in the evening. 
Worth had carried two batteries in the suburbs. According 
to my instructions he here posted guards and sentinels, and 
placed his troops under shelter for the night. There was but 
one more obstacle, the San Cosine gate, (custom house,) be¬ 
tween him and the great square in front of the Cathedral 
and palace—the heart of the city, and that barrier it was 
known could not, by daylight, resist our seige guns thirty 
minutes. 

“■I had gone back to the foot of Chapultepec, the point 
from which the two aqueducts begin to diverge, some hours 
earlier, in order to be near the depot, and in easy communi¬ 
cation with Quitman and I wiggs as w’ell as with Worth.” 

I beg leave to bring to the notice of the general-in-chief, 
that he has entirely misconceived the facts of the case. Pass¬ 
ing by, for the present, several errors in the report. I proceed 
to invite his attention to the marked sentences. I hey read 
thus:” “By 8 o’clock in the evening Worth had carried two 
batteries in the suburbs.” “According to my instructions, lie 
here (that is in the suburbs) posted guards anti sentinels, and 
placed bis troops under shelter for the night.” “ There was 
but one more obstacle, the San Cosine gate, (custom house,) 
between him and the great square in front of* the Cathedral 
and palace,” On these sentences, marked in the quoted 
printed paragraph annexed, I have to observe, 





















31 


1 st. That mj* command was not halted and sheltered for 
ihe night in the suburbs, nor did I receive instructions to 
that ent et. 

2 d. That before six o'clock my command had carried 
“ the gate, or custom house, of San Cosine,” captured the 
cannon which defended it, and turned upon the flying 1 
enemy. 

3d. That one of my brigades quartered, that night, 
several hundred yards within the gate, and my head-quarters 
with it; the pickets and patrols being advanced to a C hurch, 
where the 6th infantry now quarters, more than half way 
from the gate San Cosine to the Alameda ; the other, and 
Ridgely’s brigade quartered for convenience at and by the 
gate. 

1 he «ight position of my troops was in the knowledge of 
two officers of general head-quarter’s staff, and it is, or was 
within the knowledge of other officers of the staff that by 8 
o’clock heavy guns, a mortar, and 24-pounder, v\ere got up 
from the fai rear, and before nine opened upon tin great 
plaza, said guns being in battery “ at the San Cosine gate,” 
die firing of which brought out (as was avered by them 
at the time; the Commissioners who reached my night 
quarters, some two hundred yards within that “one more 
obstacle,” at half-past one, a. in., and it was from thence I 
passed them, in charge of an officer of my staff to the 
general-in chief, whom f supposed to be near Chapulte- 
l»c.e, but who was found nt Tacubaya. lain aware that the 
picture referred to in the official gives a wrong position to 
my troops. Aside from my own official report which was 
before the general, his own staff could have convicted the 
picture of error. 

Very respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

W. J. WORTH. 

Brevet Maj. Gen. 

Endorsement. 

Respectfully forwarded : 

I might animadvert justly and severely upon the tone of 
the within, and upon several of its assertions; but will under 
the circun stances, say that I committed an error in saying, 
in ray report, that the gate ot San Cosine was not passed by 
Worth’s division in the evening of the 13th of September. 
That gate was the second battery carried by the division, 
and I gave the division credit lor having passed txvo. 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 

January, 1848. 

It would extend this documentary Memoir too 
much, to introduce,ali the vindictive feuds which 
General Scott provoked with the officers of the 
Mexican campaign. General Jesup, General 
Marshall, Col. Harney, Capt. Montgomery, and 
a multitude of subordinates are involved in the 
general letter of crimination at the close of the 
war, levelled at the President and Secretary— 
and it is made a grievous offence in them, that 
Uiey did not give way to the violent and op¬ 
pressive temper, which required General Taylor 
to be stript of the remnant of the officers left with 
him to confront Santa Anna, to form court 
martials, to try those in Scott’s army, with whom 
he had quarrelled. Mr. Marcy in reply to the 
complaint justly says, in his last letter to General 
Scott: “ Subsequent events have -proved, that it was 
most fortunate the President did not comply with 
your request—-for had he done so, some of the qfficers 
highest in rank and most conspicuous at Buena 
Vista, might at that critical conjuncture have been 
separated from their commands, and engaged in a 
court at a distance from that glorious scene of 
action.” The Secretary concludes his remarks 
on this point by observing to General Scott, 
that “ no man has more reason than yourself to re¬ 
joice that no order emanated from Washington, 
though requested by you, which would have further 
impaired the efficiency of Gen. Taylor’s command in 
the crisis that then awaited him” —and the matter 
which would have made Gen. Scott particularly 
answerable for the absence of the officers, is pre¬ 
viously given in these words “Had the court 

•v f • . 


been composed of officers taken from General 
Taylor’s command, it would still further have 
weakened his condition, already weak in conse¬ 
quence of the very large force which you (Gen. 
Scott) had withdrawn from him.” This is a 
pregnant fact, for it shows that what General 
Taylor had attributed to the Government in re¬ 
gard to stripping him of such a large force, was 
Scott’s, not the Cabinet’s act. 

This whole letter and that of Scott containing 
his impeachment of the administration ought to 
be read now by the nation—Scott’s was prepared 
for this very occasion. It isan attempt through¬ 
out to derogate from the Democratic Government 
which waged the war—to appropriate to him¬ 
self all the results of the mighty risk which the 
Democratic party encountered m declaring it— 
of the blood which its citizen-soldiers poured out 
to maintain in it the cause of their country—and 
carry all with him into the ranks of the whigs, 
invoking them, as a return, to crown him with 
the Presidency. He has succeeded so far as to 
put down Fillmore, Webster, and Crittenden— 
the men of ability and renown, as party leaders. 
They were opposed to the declaration of the war 
—Scott begged and pressed himself into it—and 
now by the utmost bitterness and vindictiveness 
against those who indulged his participation, he 
gets with his own party the advantage of those 
eminent men, who hazarded everything to main¬ 
tain its policy, while he betrayed it. Having 
profited by the employment solicited from a Dem¬ 
ocratic administration, he betrays that too—cries 
out that he is a persecuted man after it has given 
him all he asked or could wish, and with an ef¬ 
frontery, well exposed by Mr. Marcy, charges 
upon it his own misconduct in it? service, and 
even denounces it for conceding to him what h-e 


proposed in his own behalf. Marcy’s reply to 
Scott’s accusations were so overwhelming that 
he never attempted to controvert either its state¬ 
ments or arguments. This correspondence has 
been largely circulated recently. It is barely 
necessary to refer to it as a part of Scott’s life 
recorded by his own pen. 

Such has been Scott’s career as a public mas 
—an officer in the army for 45 years. His mil¬ 
itary life has nothing in it like that of Washing¬ 
ton, Jackson, or Harrison. These men grew 
up and were educated among citizens and equals 
—Scott began life in command of a company" of 
Regulars, a rank and file accustomed to black 
his boots and dress his horse and walk in silenee 
in his presence, touching their caps with the fore 
finger. It was in this school that he acquired the 
habit of indulging an overbearing, arrogant, in¬ 
solent temper—a temper prone to disregard the 
appearance of consistency of principle or of con¬ 
duct—and not over-scrupulous in preserving con¬ 
sistency even in statements of facts. The result 
is, a character which may manage a regular sol¬ 
diery embodied as a “se// sustaining machine ”— 
but is not one to be trusted with the management 
of the civil concerns of a free people. In his letter 
aecepting the Whig nomination to the Presiden¬ 
cy, he speaks of obedience as the “one principle 
of military conduct” which is to characterise his 
Presidential authority. This is a striking* para- 
















graph in the last revelation he has made of him¬ 
self to the public : 

u Convinced that harmony or good will between the dif¬ 
ferent quarters of our broad country is essential to the 
present and futulre interests of the Republic, and with a 
devotion to those interests that can know no South no North , 
I should neither countenance nor tolerate any sedition, 
disorder, faction, or resistance to the law, or the. Union, on 
any pretext in. any part of the land ; and I should carry 
into the civil administration this one principle of military 
conduct—obedience to the legislative and judicial depart 
merits of Government, each in its constitutional sphere — 
saving only, in respect to the Legislature, the possible re¬ 
sort to the veto power—always to he most cautiously exer- 
@ised, and under the strictest restraints and necessities.” 

He will not “ tolerate any sedition, disorder, 
faction or resistance to the law or the Union in 
any part of the land.” The elder John Adams 
had a law passed by Congress against “ sedition, 
disorder, faction,” &o. &c., but that law was re¬ 
pealed long since, because it was found that our 
countrymen being sometimesasediiious, disorder¬ 
ly, factious people, must be tolerated in those 
manifestations which more or less characterize 
popular liberty every where, and which when 
too severely repressed break out into revolution 
or sink down into slavery. It is evident from 
the context, that Gen. Scott’s mind was directed 
to the troubles growing out of the sectional ques¬ 
tion in our country, and his edict in advance 
that he would “ know no north and no south, 
and would tolerate no sedition, disorder, faction 
or resistance to law,” was but preliminary warn¬ 
ing, that “ he would carry into civil administra¬ 
tion this one principle of military conduct—obe¬ 
dience to the legislative and judicial Departments 


of Government,” with the promptitude of a 
regular bred officer. His course in Mexico 
shows that he will execute this pronunciamien- 
to. He has meditated well the time and the 
mode of applying his “one principle of milita¬ 
ry conduct” to the seditious disorder, faction or 
resistance to law on the part of abolitionists in 
the north, or State rights men in the south.— 
That he is resolved not to tolerate the irregular 
and unlawful conduct which he has already so 
distinctly branded with his displeasure is*clear, 
and it is equally clear that he relies on his military 
scholarship to furnish the remedy. It is the 
European plan of dealing with sedition—our 
country had a taste of it under the first federal 
ruler, who blended both of General Scott’s fa¬ 
vorite political ideas in his famous alien and se¬ 
dition laws—the one to rid the country of aliens, 
the other of sedition, by force. General Scott 
has exhibited his theory as to aliens in various 
lights, and he has given one striking example of 
his mode of execution—and we may gather 
from it how he would manage the sedition and fac¬ 
tion north and south which he is resolved not 
to tolerate. With the avowal contained in his 
several letters on these topics, and his deliberate 
declaration in favor of a national Bank and of a 
national Bankrupt law—the one to build up a 
gigantic monied power, the other hordes of privil¬ 
eged speculators to uphold it—there is little 
doubt but that a regular bred military man at the 
head of the government might make short shrift 
for any troublesome factions that annoyed him. 


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